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Executive Summary 
There is an intrinsic relationship between organisational resilience and improving the 
resilience of communities.  Enabling the continued operation of organisations, in and 
following crises, significantly impacts on the medium to long term recovery and health of the 
wider community.  Increased resilience is also important when considering the 
interconnectedness of modern organisations, where disruptions can have significant and 
widespread impacts globally.  There is increasing demand for organisations to exhibit high 
reliability in the face of adversity; decision makers must address not only the crises that they 
know will happen, but also those that they cannot foresee. 
The term resilience has been used freely across a wide range of academic disciplines and in 
many different contexts.  There is little consensus regarding what resilience is, what it means 
for organisations and, more importantly, how organisations might achieve greater resilience 
in the face of increasing threats.  This study offers a definition of resilience that is applicable 
to organisations. 
 
Resilience is a function of an organisation’s: 
• situation awareness,  
• management of keystone vulnerabilities and  
• adaptive capacity 
 in a complex, dynamic and interconnected environment. 
The research described in this report looks at ten New Zealand organisations from a range of 
industry sectors, sizes, localities and types to discover common issues that foster or create 
barriers to increased resilience.  A process for Resilience Management is described for both 
evaluating and improving an organisation’s resilience.   
The Resilience Management process involves: 
• Element 1:  Building an Awareness of Resilience Issues.  The tools used to achieve 
an increased awareness of resilience issues include the use of semi-formal, open ended 
interviews, surveys, reporting of observations back to the organisations and 
brainstorming hazard events using Consequence Scenarios. 
• Element 2:  Selection of Essential Organisational Components.  Essential 
organisational components are those parts of an organisation critical to ongoing 
operations and functions.  These components are mapped from an internal and external 
perspective, including the identification of key stakeholder groups. 
• Element 3:  Self Assessment of Vulnerability.  The organisation then assesses each 
of the selected essential components for criticality to operations (both during the 
immediate response and recovery periods of a crisis) and preparedness for disaster.  
Additionally, organisations that want to investigate a specific event, or embark on 
planning for a specific purpose, can assess the susceptibility of components to that 
event.  Assessments are all completed on a qualitative scale. 
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• Element 4:  Identification and Prioritisation of Keystone Vulnerabilities.  Information 
from the vulnerability assessments is then plotted onto Vulnerability Matrices that allow 
the organisation to visualise those components that present the greatest threat in a crisis.  
Matrices are produced from an all-hazards perspective (using only criticality and 
preparedness information) and from a hazard specific perspective (using criticality, 
preparedness and susceptibility data). 
• Element 5:  Increasing Adaptive Capacity.  The tool used in this part of the process is 
the Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS).  REDS offer a way for 
organisations to practise and test their crisis preparedness, leadership skills, decision 
making and communication skills in a time and resource efficient way.  Desktop REDS 
can be completed in a matter of two hours and can be scaled to include only a small 
group of key decision makers through to the entire organisation.  They can also extend to 
include key external partners via a multi-organisational approach. 
From the data obtained with the case-study organisations a set of 15 generic resilience 
indicators have been identified.  These indicators represent the key resilience issues that 
apply to all of the organisations in this study.  They have been subdivided into the specific, 
but intrinsically related categories of situation awareness, management of keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity.  The 15 resilience indicators are outlined in the 
following table. 
 
Resilience Indicators 
Situation Awareness Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities Adaptive Capacity 
SA1
Roles and 
Responsibilities KV1 Planning Strategies AC1 Silo Mentality 
SA2
Understanding of 
Hazards and 
Consequences  
KV2
Participation in 
Exercises AC2
Communications and 
Relationships 
SA3
Connectivity 
Awareness KV3
Capability and 
Capacity of Internal 
Resources 
AC3
Strategic Vision and 
Outcome Expectancy 
SA4 Insurance Awareness KV4
Capability and 
Capacity of External 
Resources 
AC4
Information and 
Knowledge 
SA5 Recovery Priorities KV5
Organisational 
Connectivity AC5
Leadership, 
Management and 
Governance Structures 
 
Each organisation that took part in this study was assessed for all of the indicators relative to 
the other case-study organisations.  This assessment produced a relative overall resilience 
profile for each organisation.  Resilience profiles have been developed to give organisations 
a visual description of their resilience and indicate areas of strength and weakness.  Two 
examples of resilience profiles are presented below showing (a) an organisation with very 
high organisational resilience compared to one that has a very low resilience (b). 
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a. 
 
b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each of the ten case-study organisations were found to have distinct personalities and 
expressed different resilience qualities.  Observations included: 
• Many organisations are so busy dealing with day-to-day crises that they often don’t 
consider how to cope with hazards that they haven’t experienced before.  Other 
organisations have difficulty moving past previous events and focus planning on 
preparations should that same type of event happen again.   
• The organisational vision is not widely used as a critical crisis response tool to 
provide a framework for identifying where the organisation should be heading.  In its 
absence, many organisations approach emergency management from a ‘fighting 
fires’ perspective. 
• There are often different views among decision makers as to what an effective crisis 
plan might look like.  Some expect a ‘magic box’ holding all the answers, providing all 
required actions for all hazards.  Others see a plan as little more than a collection of 
key contact details and some basic procedures for staff from a health and safety 
perspective. 
• Assumptions of key recovery priorities are generally not well understood, particularly 
amongst the executive or senior management teams.  Problems that are often 
exposed during exercises or actual events, highlight that priorities are only common 
knowledge for individuals or specific departments and not the organisation as a 
whole.  
• Almost all of the organisations displayed significant shortcomings with knowledge of 
stakeholder roles and responsibilities in day-to-day operations.  Those organisations 
that had experienced crises in the past also indicated that this issue was exacerbated 
in stressful situations.   
• It appears that few organisations consider their staff as stakeholders, and as such the 
awareness of employee fears and expectations in a crisis are very poorly understood.  
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Level of Situation Awareness
Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities
Degree of Adaptive Capacity
Resilience Envelope for 
Organisation X.
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Level of Situation Awareness
Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities
gree of Adaptive 
apacity
De
C
Resilience 
Envelope for 
Organisation X.
Resilient Organisations iv www.resorgs.org.nz  
  
Many of the larger organisations commented on the difficulties of informing and 
engaging staff in planning strategies for emergency management, particularly 
regarding pandemic (staff not wanting to know, decision makers not wanting to 
frighten staff unnecessarily etc).  However, few of these organisations had made any 
effort to increase the awareness of key decision makers about staff issues.   
• In this study few organisations had considered that crises may occur coincidently with 
a need to continue business-as-usual and the demands this could place on 
resources.     
• The organisations all appeared to have expectations of other organisations (including 
emergency services, government agencies and Civil Defence) that are 
disproportionate with the support these organisations could reasonably offer.   
• Many organisations do not have an accurate vision of their own importance in the 
community.  Following a crisis most organisations expect that support would be 
immediately available; extra staff, water supplies, builders, insurance assessors.  
Other organisations that do have an important role to play in community recovery had 
poor knowledge of this role and how to manage community expectations. 
Common issues for management teams that emerged from the REDS exercise during the 
case studies included: 
• Many groups felt overwhelmed by the crisis scenario and spent much of the first 
phase metaphorically with their ‘head in their hands’ thinking that there was little they 
could do to manage the crisis.  It is important for management teams to quickly shift 
from this natural response to become more proactive, with strategies needed to 
encourage them to seek out information and to focus more positively on what ‘can be 
done’.   
• A few groups were observed to be very proactive, but in their rush to make and 
implement decisions quickly they failed to fully scope the full implications of the crisis.  
Often this meant they ‘solved the wrong problems’, highlighting the value of time 
taken to identify the full scope of potential impacts before moving onto solutions. 
• Some management teams performed very well, so long as strong leadership was in 
place.  Removing this leader under the context of the crisis scenario sometimes saw 
the team collapse, providing a graphic illustration of the importance of succession 
planning. 
• Most organisations believed that their day-to-day relationships with critically linked 
organisations (including customers and competitors) were excellent and that this 
would be enough to ensure a continuation of expected levels of service and 
communications in a crisis.  In saying this, many identified that their most important 
suppliers and consultants were likely to be limited in their ability to provide support in 
a crisis, but these organisations had made no steps to ensuring the services of 
alternative organisations, or establishing preferential service agreements.  
Two generic Resilience Management strategies have been developed for organisations 
looking to improve their resilience; a Resilient Communications Strategy and an Emergency 
Planning Strategy.  Used together, these two strategies target all of the resilience indicators 
identified to increase overall organisational resilience.   It is important to realise, however that 
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Resilience Management is designed as an iterative process for long term organisational 
development and not as a one-off crisis management tool.  The process is scalable and can 
be accessed by organisations of all manner of size and type, and can be applied at various 
levels within an organisation. 
Future work under the Resilient Organisations research programme is to include further 
quantification of the methodology and the resilience indicators, resilience maturity models, 
understanding resilient leadership, communication of resilience concepts and international 
case studies to further determine the range of resilience for organisations. 
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Resilient Organisations Research Programme 
The Resilient Organisations Research Programme aims to improve the resilience of New 
Zealand organisations to major hazard events. Organisations manage, maintain and operate 
our infrastructure, create our economy and contribute to our society. The ability of 
organisations to respond effectively following a hazard event will have a large influence on 
the length of time that essential services are unavailable, and ultimately how well our 
communities cope with major disaster.  
Particular aspects of organisational response and recovery focused on by the research team 
include:  
• how organisations plan for hazard events,  
• their ability to direct resources effectively during crises, and  
• the legal and contractual frameworks within which they will need to operate, and the 
specific challenges of post-disaster reconstruction.  
The Resilient Organisations research programme is funded by the Foundation for Research 
Science and Technology (FRST) of New Zealand.  
For more information on Resilient Organisations, see our website at www.resorgs.org.nz  
 
 
Using this Report 
This research report has been developed with the support of public-good research funding.  
As such we are happy for both practitioners and researchers to copy, distribute and use this 
report to further encourage organisations, both in New Zealand and internationally, to strive 
for greater resilience.  All that we ask is that you appropriately reference and acknowledge 
this report in your work.   
This research report has specifically been written with a practitioner audience in mind.  If you 
would like a more detailed explanation of the research on which this report is based, please 
visit our website: www.resorgs.org.nz/publications and download the full Ph.D. thesis which 
sets out the research methodology and findings in more detail: 
McManus. S. T.  (2007)  Organisational Resilience in New Zealand.  PhD thesis, Department 
of Civil Engineering, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
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1 Introduction 
Organisations today are increasingly aware of the need to prepare for the unexpected.  High 
profile international events of the last decade, such as the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina  and the emerging threat of a pandemic all 
serve to remind organisations that the unimaginable can and does happen.   
Stories emerge from these events of organisations that survived or failed; at first glance there 
does not appear to be a particular pattern.  Some survivors had excellent disaster response 
plans in place; others had none, surviving purely on the merits of strong leadership and the 
commitment and determination of staff.  Many organisations that are devastated simply 
never reopen again; others evolve so radically that they are hard to recognise from their pre-
crisis form.   
This research project seeks to explore what it is that makes some organisations more able to 
survive a major crisis than others, and suggests a framework for both evaluating and 
improving the resilience of individual organisations. 
 
1.1   What is Resilience and Why is it Important? 
There is an intrinsic relationship between organisational resilience and improving the 
resilience of communities.  Enabling the continued operation of organisations, in and 
following crises, significantly impacts on the medium to long term recovery and health of the 
wider community.  Increased resilience is also important when considering the 
interconnectedness of modern organisations, where disruptions can have significant and 
widespread impacts globally.  Additionally, the increasing reliance on technology and 
technology providers influences the desire for organisations, and the communities that they 
serve, to become more resilient.  There is increasing demand for organisations to exhibit 
high reliability in the face of adversity; decision makers must address not only the crises that 
they know will happen, but also those that they cannot foresee. 
Resilience is a concept that has had many definitions, depending on the areas of application; 
from the deformation of materials, the resilience of ecological systems through to the 
resilience of children and vulnerable community groups.  The need to identify what resilience 
means to organisations is the focus of this report.   
Essentially, an organisation that has an enhanced resilience is one that is more likely to 
weather both the problems of day-to-day business and successfully navigate the issues that 
arise in a crisis.  Therefore, the following definition of organisational resilience, arising from 
this research, is proposed. 
 
Resilience is a function of an organisation’s: 
• situation awareness,  
• management of keystone vulnerabilities and  
• adaptive capacity 
 in a complex, dynamic and interconnected environment. 
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Situation awareness is a measure of an organisation’s understanding and perception of its 
entire operating environment.  This includes: 
• the ability to look forward for opportunities as well as potential crises,  
• the ability to identify crises and their consequences accurately, 
• an enhanced understanding of the trigger factors for crises, 
• an increased awareness of the resources available both internally and externally, 
• a better understanding of minimum operating requirements from a recovery 
perspective; and, 
• an enhanced awareness of expectations, obligations and limitations in relation to the 
community of stakeholders, both internally (staff) and externally (customers, 
suppliers, consultants etc). 
Management of keystone vulnerabilities defines those aspects of an organisation, 
operational and managerial, that have the potential to have significant negative impacts in a 
crisis situation.  The impacts of keystone vulnerabilities may be either instantaneous (occur 
suddenly and take the failure of only one component to have a significant negative impact) or 
insidious (small failures of key components lead to a large scale cascading-type failure over 
time).  It is important for organisations to also have a clear understanding of the links 
between components and the vulnerabilities that may arise from these.  These may include 
specific tangible organisational components such as: 
• buildings, structures and critical supplies,  
• computers, services and specialised equipment, 
• individual managers, decision makers and subject matter experts. 
They may also include less tangible components, for example: 
• relationships between key groups internally and externally, 
• communications structures, and 
• perception of the organisational strategic vision. 
Adaptive capacity is a measure of the culture and dynamics of an organisation that allow it 
to make decisions in a timely and appropriate manner both in day-to-day business and also 
in crises.  Adaptive capacity considers aspects of an organisation that may include (but not 
be limited to): 
• leadership and decision making structures, 
• the acquisition, dissemination and retention of information and knowledge, and 
• the degree of creativity and flexibility that the organisation promotes or tolerates. 
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A resilient organisation has three main qualities above a non-resilient organisation: 
• A greater awareness of itself, its key stakeholders and the environment within which it 
conducts its business. 
• An increased knowledge of its keystone vulnerabilities, and the impacts that those 
vulnerabilities could have on the organisation; both negative and positive. 
• The ability to adapt to changed situations with new and innovative solutions and/or 
the ability to adapt the tools that it already has to cope with new and unforeseen 
situations. 
An organisation with heightened resilience is able to quickly identify and respond to those 
situations that present potentially negative consequences and find solutions to minimise 
these impacts.  Furthermore, resilience enables an organisation to see opportunities in even 
the most difficult circumstances which may allow it to move forward even in times of 
adversity. 
 
1.2   Scope of this Project 
This research project has been designed to achieve two important objectives: 
• To identify features which contribute to an organisation’s resilience, irrespective of the 
size, type or nature of the organisation in question. 
• To develop tools that will both assess and improve resilience for these organisations.   
The project used a total of ten case-study organisations, specifically selected to provide the 
greatest possible representation of organisations in New Zealand; private, public, large, small 
and from a wide range of industry sectors. 
A pilot study was conducted with the first case-study organisation, and from this study a 
preliminary framework for Resilience Management was developed.  This framework, the 
basis of much of this report, was subsequently refined and modified with the following nine 
case-study organisations.   
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2 Resilience Management  
In many organisations, risk management, business continuity and emergency management 
planning are commonly viewed as closely related, but a practical means of linking them is 
often not achieved.  The Resilience Management framework brings together all the planning 
that an organisation may have done under one umbrella called Resilience Management.   
Resilience Management can also help an organisation to be successful following any crisis by 
making resilience part of the day-to-day operations and by helping organisations effectively 
deal with high stress crisis situations.   
An organisation undertaking Resilience Management will increase its situation awareness and 
have a greater understanding of the vulnerabilities that can critically undermine its 
performance.  It will also improve its adaptive capacity as decision makers learn more about 
the underlying value systems of the organisation and of key individuals in the organisation.  
The process highlights the expectations that decision makers have of their enterprise and key 
stakeholders, and it offers a way to test existing plans and create new ones. 
Each of the elements in this framework can be used in combination with other elements or in 
isolation to progressively increase an organisation’s resilience.  For optimum results, the 
elements should be used consecutively and in a relatively short time frame so that the 
knowledge is retained and used to its best advantage.  Depending on the size of the 
organisation and the level that is targeted for improved resilience (the leadership team versus 
the entire organisation, for example), the Resilience Management process may take between 
one week and one month.   
This report describes the tools and techniques developed for undertaking Resilience 
Management as part of an iterative process.  The elements of the process, and the tools that 
are used to develop each element, are shown in Table 1 and explained further in the following 
sections. 
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Situation Awareness Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Adaptive Capacity 
Element 1 
Building an Awareness of 
Resilience Issues 
• Interviews, Surveys and 
Reports 
Gathering information 
from key stakeholders 
and validating that data. 
• Consequence Scenarios 
Building an awareness of 
crises causes and 
consequences. 
 
Element 2 
Selection of Critical 
Organisational Components 
Identifying the critical 
components for continued 
service, operations and 
essential functions.  
Achieved from an internal 
and an external 
perspective. 
Element 2 
Selection of Critical 
Organisational Components 
Building an awareness of 
essential components for 
ongoing services, 
operations and functions 
from an internal and 
external perspective. 
 
Element 3 
Self-Assessment of 
Vulnerability 
A facilitated or 
independent self-
assessment of selected 
components for criticality, 
preparedness and 
susceptibility to determine 
vulnerability. 
Element 4 
Prioritisation of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Using a vulnerability matrix 
to map the data from the 
vulnerability self-
assessment, identification 
and prioritisation of 
keystone vulnerabilities is 
achieved. 
 
Element 5  
Readiness Exercises and 
Disaster Simulations (REDS) 
Using the Consequence 
Scenarios to build 
awareness of the range 
and impacts of various 
crisis events. 
Element 5  
Readiness Exercises and 
Disaster Simulations (REDS)
Identification and ongoing 
testing of identified 
vulnerabilities in simulated 
crisis situations. 
 
Element 5  
Readiness Exercises and 
Disaster Simulations (REDS)
Improvement of adaptive 
capacity looking at: 
• Environment within which 
the organisation conducts 
its operations, services and 
functions. 
• Leadership and decision 
making for crises 
• Communications structures 
• Testing and execution of 
existing or proposed plans 
including understanding of 
minimum operating 
requirements. 
• Assessment of 
organisational strategic 
vision as a crisis 
management tool. 
• Observation of 
understanding of key 
stakeholder limitations, 
expectations and 
requirements. 
    
Table 1.  The tools used for each element of the Resilience Management process and the 
relationships between them.
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2.1   Step 1 - Building Awareness of Resilience Issues 
In order for resilience management to be effective an organisation must have a clear 
understanding of the issues that contribute to its resilience, in a day-to-day environment as 
well as in a potential crisis.  This is called building situation awareness and includes:  
• the current, and expected future, operating environment;  
• the resources that the organisation has at its disposal;  
• the expectations and limitations of all stakeholders, and; 
• the positive and negative impacts of various types of crises. 
   
2.1.1 Interviews, Surveys and Reporting 
Interviewing key stakeholders internally (staff, shareholders etc) and externally (customers, 
suppliers, contractors and even the wider community etc) is an excellent way to assess 
situation awareness.   
 
 
 
 
Even when targeting Resilience Management at a senior decision 
making level it is important to gather data from other people 
in the organisation, at a variety of operational and decision 
making levels.  The validity of viewpoints can be later 
determined with a targeted survey. 
Often, during interviewing key decision makers had a different 
perspective on the organisation and its resilience compared to 
the views of staff at other levels. 
WHO REALLY KNOWS? 
 
 
 
Interviewers ideally should have some experience in conducting interviews, have a good 
understanding of resilience management and be able to provide an objective perspective for 
the organisation.  Interviewers also need to be aware of the relative importance of the 
information they gather.  Comments made by only one person may not be representative of 
the entire organisation.  However, if a senior employee and decision maker seems to have a 
different perspective to others in the organisation, this may indicate some significant resilience 
issues.  Therefore it is important that the interviewer remains objective and open to all potential 
resilience issues that arise.   
Interviews should be conducted in a semi-structured and open-ended format with the 
employee being encouraged to expand on specific leads given by the interviewer.  These 
leads relate to the specific resilience indicators that are presented in Section 3 in this report. 
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After all interviews have been completed and the information collated, it is important to present 
the main themes uncovered in the interviews back to the organisation.  Discussion reports are 
an ideal way of doing this because they encourage the organisation to look at itself and its 
perceptions from an external perspective.  These types of reports also offer the organisation a 
mirror of the perceptions (and possibly misconceptions) that pervade the organisation, and of 
which they may be unaware. 
Surveys can also be created and, when based on information in the discussion document, help 
to ensure the validity of the interviewers observations.  The surveys help in assessing the 
degree to which particular views or perceptions permeate the organisation or even external 
stakeholders.  Surveys are also valuable in determining how well particular strategies or 
procedures are progressing in an organisation and highlighting areas for improvement.  Many 
organisations have versions of staff/stakeholder engagement surveys and these can be a 
valuable source of information for developing resilience management. 
 
2.1.2 Consequence Scenarios 
A simple technique developed for helping to evaluate an organisation’s situation awareness is 
the use of Consequence Scenarios.  These Consequence Scenarios are used to assess how 
well an organisation understands the types of hazards it may one day face, and the potential 
impacts these may have on the organisation.   
 
Very few of the organisations in this study had considered 
that crises may occur coincidently with a need to continue 
business-as-usual and what this might mean from a human 
resources perspective. 
Many organisations are so busy dealing with their day-to-day 
crises that they never take the time to consider the events 
that they haven’t yet experienced.  Others have difficulty 
moving past previous events and insist on focusing on 
preparing for a repeat of the same crisis! 
The Woods for the Trees
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequence Scenarios help organisations to recognise that although the breadth of potential 
hazards they face is vast, there are common management strategies they can use to cope 
with whatever comes their way. 
A set of four Consequence Scenarios have been developed to help organisations improve 
their awareness of crises and consequences and are designed to simulate a wide range of 
potential effects on organisations.   Due to the variability in how specific threats may affect an 
organisation, the focus moves from individual hazards to a set of particular event 
consequences. 
Of course, there will always be events that cannot be foreseen and events that, even if 
foreseen, the consequences may not be accurately anticipated.  The aim of the Consequence 
Scenarios is therefore three-fold:   
Resilient Organisations 7 www.resorgs.org.nz  
  
• Firstly, they encourage organisations to identify those events that are foreseeable and 
consider how they might cope with the outcomes that they cannot foresee.  They also 
expand an organisation’s knowledge about the range and scope of different hazard 
types and their potential consequences, rather than just focusing on a few high profile, 
previously experienced or well known hazards.  The Consequence Scenarios are a 
valuable way to begin assessing and training decision makers to adapt to situations 
outside of their expected outcomes. 
• Secondly, the Consequence Scenarios help assess how an organisation might address 
the failure, temporary or otherwise, of linked organisations.  It is important for 
organisations to consider how the downfall of an important ally or rival will affect them. 
• Thirdly, they allow organisations to prepare for different hazard events that have similar 
consequences at the same time and offer a more holistic planning framework that is 
more economical than planning for individual hazards; often the strategies used to 
mitigate the consequences for one hazard can be used for other hazards.  Therefore 
Consequence Scenarios offer an organisation a way of collating the critical 
components of crisis situations and maximise its resources in preparing for these types 
of hazards. In addition, the Consequence Scenarios allow organisations to consider the 
opportunities that may arise from a crisis rather than only focusing on the negative 
impacts.  
The principal characteristics of the Consequence Scenarios are presented in Table 2. 
 
Scenario 
Type Scenario Characteristics 
Regional  Investigates an organisation’s response to and recovery from significant physical damage to buildings, contents, and resources, coupled with severe disruptions to 
lifeline services such as transportation, electricity, water and telecommunications. 
Societal This scenario focuses on an event resulting in extended staffing absences.  In this 
event physical infrastructure is intact, but staff are either unable or unwilling to be at 
work.   
Localised Focuses on an organisation specific incident resulting in severe disruption to normal operations and reputation impacts and may include loss of life or injury.  The intense 
focus of media and regulatory agencies requires the organisation to focus on 
managing stakeholder perception as well as the physical response and recovery 
from the event.   
Distal Tests organisational response and recovery regarding impacts on business flow through the organisational network such as key suppliers or customers.  This could 
include, for example, the impacts of government restrictions on fuel supplies or the 
collapse of infrastructure such as electricity or telecommunications.  
Table 2.  The Consequence Scenarios. 
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2.2   Element 2 – Selection of Organisational Components 
It is important near the start of the Resilience Management process to clearly define the scope 
and scale of the assessment.  For example, is the organisation interested in developing the 
resilience of its principal decision maker, senior management team, a specific department 
such as IT, the entire organisation, or in conjunction with critically linked organisations?  Ideally 
of course the overarching goal is to improve the resilience of the whole organisation.  In the 
face of resource, budget or buy-in limitations however, it may be necessary to limit the scope.  
The methodology is equally valid at any scale, but does require a well defined purpose and 
scope to provide context for the analysis. 
The use of the organisational vision as a critical crisis 
response tool was not widely recognised by many of the case-
study organisations.  The organisational vision provides a 
framework for identifying where the organisation should be 
heading in a crisis.  In the absence of this, many 
organisations commented that their approach to emergency 
management was one of ‘fighting fires’. 
Fighting Fires 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the scope has been defined, the organisation can then start to build up a systems map 
that identifies those aspects of the organisation that are integral to its continued operation.  
This systems map eventually forms the basis for assessing keystone vulnerabilities.   
For the sake of simplicity and manageability, it is important that this systems map is developed 
at an appropriate level of detail for the scale and scope of the assessment.  Although a very 
detailed systems map provides for more accurate assessment of vulnerabilities, it is also likely 
to make the assessment much more daunting for managers.  Examples of organisational 
components at a senior management level are presented in Table 3.   
There is a distinction between internal components and external components for an 
organisation.  Internal components are those that the organisation has the direct ability to 
manage in terms of resilience.  For example, employment contracts with staff would be an 
internal component.  External components on the other hand are those that, while potentially 
having some influence over their management, an organisation has no direct ability to change.  
For example, the supply of telecommunications services by a third party supplier would be an 
external component because although the organisation may be able to manage its response to 
such an outage, it cannot control the cause of that outage. 
Successful resilience management requires ongoing development of situation awareness 
within an organisation.  The involvement of the organisation in producing the organisational 
component maps is critical to this development.  The people who will be implementing 
resilience management in an organisation should be involved as much as possible in this 
mapping process to increase their own situation awareness. 
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INTERNAL COMPONENTS 
Physical Components Human Components Process Components 
Offices General Staff Risk Management 
IT Hardware Senior Staff Continuity Planning 
Buildings 
& 
Equipment Security 
Communication 
& Relationships 
Board 
Direct 
Planning 
Emergency 
Management 
 Vehicles Management Leadership  Cash Flow 
 Software/IP  Succession  Market/brand 
Knowledge 
 Inventory  Staff Welfare  Insurance 
Services Generators Backup   
 Fuel Supplies 
Information/ 
Knowledge Privacy/ 
Protection 
  
 IT networks  Training/Review   
EXTERNAL COMPONENTS 
Physical Components Human Components Process Components 
Services Electricity Communication
& Relationships 
Emergency  
Services 
Indirect 
Planning 
Inter- 
connectedness 
 Water  Local Authorities  Statutory 
Compliance 
 Sewerage  Customers  Contracts 
 Telecommunications  Suppliers  Reputation/Image 
 Transportation  Media   
Table 3.  An example of the types of internal and external organisational components mapped for 
organisations in this study. 
 
2.3 Element 3 – Self-Assessment of Vulnerability 
An assessment of vulnerability is important in resilience management because it contributes to 
increased situation awareness, promotes the development of adaptive capacity and also gives 
the organisation tangible objectives to work towards.   
Vulnerability is self-assessed to improve the organisational buy-in.  There is always a danger 
in having an external facilitator assessing vulnerability as some people can feel misunderstood 
or misrepresented by the facilitator and not accept the recommendations.  Using a self-
assessment technique for vulnerability the organisation is encouraged to take ownership of the 
issues that emerge, and consequently can accept accountability for improving vulnerabilities.   
Initially vulnerability assessments should be conducted from an all hazards perspective.  The 
vulnerability assessment looks at the criticality and preparedness of critical organisational 
components (Element 2).  If required, a scenario can be created using the Consequence 
Scenarios to provide a more specific context if an organisation wants to target a particular 
hazard, or threat (pandemic planning, for example).  An assessment of the susceptibility of 
critical organisational components is used in this instance.  The details of the vulnerability 
assessment process are described below. 
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2.3.1 Criticality 
The key question to ask when assessing criticality is: 
“How important is this particular component to the organisation’s ability to respond 
to/recover from crises?”   
The assessment process is applied to two distinct time frames in relation to crises; response 
and recovery.  The immediate response phase occurs either during or immediately following 
the onset of a crisis.  This may differ depending on the nature of the event.  The response 
phase for an earthquake may be a matter of hours or days while the response to the outbreak 
of infectious disease nationwide may be weeks or months.  An organisation moves into 
recovery when it starts to think about returning to business-as-usual conditions.  The move 
from response to recovery is not always observed as a discrete period following a crisis and 
recovery may not be recognisable as ‘business-as-usual’ conditions because the operating 
environment has changed dramatically due to the crisis event.   
Criticality for both response and recovery is divided into four broad categories; very high, high, 
moderate, low. 
 
2.3.2 Preparedness 
For preparedness assessments the key question is: 
“What level of planning or redundancy is in place to enable an effective response 
and recovery if this particular component is not functional?”   
Preparedness is measured qualitatively; high, moderate, low, none.  For example, electricity 
services may have a high level of preparedness because the organisation has chosen to 
purchase a generator.  However, an organisation without a generator might consider that its 
level of planning for the loss of electricity is low. 
 
Some staff expect a plan to be a ‘magic box’ with all the 
answers that spells out all required actions for all hazards.  
Others think the plan should be little more than a collection 
of key contact details and some basic procedures for staff from 
a health and safety perspective. 
There are often different perspectives within organisations on 
what an effective response and recovery plan might look like.   
The Magic Box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Susceptibility 
A susceptibility assessment encourages an organisation to isolate the potential impacts of 
specific types of crises.  This is likely to be required when an organisation wants, or is 
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required, to plan for a particular event, for example pandemic or earthquake.  For each 
organisational component an organisation asks: 
“How severely impacted is the (component’s) performance likely to be in this 
particular scenario?” 
For example, electricity services may be highly susceptible to a regional crisis that impacts 
infrastructure such as an earthquake, but have a very low susceptibility to social disruption 
such as an influenza pandemic.   
Susceptibility is assessed as very high, high, moderate, or low. 
The context of the assessment is important.  Organisations can use any number of techniques 
to provide an appropriate context; using the experience of a previous crisis situation or using 
the impetus of media exposure for impending events.  In this study, the Consequence 
Scenarios have provided the crisis context for the susceptibility assessment.   
Often, elements from two or more of the Consequence Scenarios are used.  Not only does this 
enable organisations to investigate vulnerabilities for more than one scenario at a time, but it 
also simulates the complex nature of crisis events.  This helps convey the reality of a crisis and 
provides a more detailed picture of the organisation’s strengths, weaknesses and the 
connectivity between components. 
 
2.4   Element 4 – Prioritisation of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, there are two ways for an organisation to use the vulnerability 
information.  Using just criticality and preparedness information it is possible to view 
vulnerabilities from an all hazards perspective.  Using the additional susceptibility information 
an organisation can look at vulnerabilities for an event of specific concern.  By looking at 
where all of this data intersects an organisation can identify its keystone vulnerabilities.   
Keystone vulnerabilities are components (or links between components) that are likely to have 
a significant negative impact on the organisation.  There are two aspects to keystone 
vulnerabilities.  Firstly is the speed at which a component failure has a negative impact (rapid 
or insidious) and secondly is the number of component failures required to have a significant 
negative impact on an organisation (discrete or cascading).  It is important that an organisation 
views and treats keystone vulnerabilities as interconnected parts of a system and not in 
isolation.   
 Common to All
In this study a number of organisational components were 
identified as keystone vulnerabilities for most of the case-
study organisations.  These included:  
• electricity and telecommunications services; 
• governance structures in an organisation; 
• communications and relationships with general staff, 
media, local authorities and emergency services, and; 
• the flow of information into and throughout the 
organisation. 
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There is the potential that some components are more vulnerable when considered as part of 
a system rather than in isolation.  For example, electricity supply may be a vulnerability on its 
own, but when considered as part of a system, its failure may cause other components to 
become keystone vulnerabilities.  The opposite is also true.  When viewed in isolation some 
organisational components may be more significant vulnerabilities than if considered as part of 
the whole system.  Therefore, it is vital that organisations have tools available to clearly 
identify their keystone vulnerabilities in order to assign appropriate resources to the areas of 
most concern.   
The following discussion outlines the vulnerability matrix; a tool developed in the study that 
presents keystone vulnerabilities in a visual format and helps organisations to clearly identify 
and prioritise them. 
 
2.4.1 The Vulnerability Matrix 
The Vulnerability Matrix (Figure 1) is a powerful tool that helps decision makers to visually 
identify those components that present the greatest potential threat, which can then be treated 
accordingly.  In this way, the matrix is an important vulnerability prioritisation tool for an 
organisation and can greatly assist in helping focus attention and resources to where they will 
provide the greatest value for an organisation. 
Vulnerability matrices are produced using preparedness and criticality information obtained in 
Element 3.  This produces an assessment of vulnerability at an ‘all-hazards’ level.  
Additionally, susceptibility information is used to produce a context specific matrix.  Examples 
of both types of vulnerability matrices are presented in Figure 1
Criticality is plotted on the x-axis and preparedness on the y-axis.  Each organisational 
component is represented by a ‘hole’ in the matrix.  For the ‘all-hazards’ matrix, all the holes 
are of equal size and it is their position on the matrix that determines their status as keystone 
vulnerabilities.   
Susceptibility data is indicated by different sized ‘holes’; the larger the ‘hole’ the greater the 
degree susceptibility.  For these context-specific matrices, keystone vulnerabilities are 
identified both by the size of the hole they produce as well as their position on the matrix. 
Keystone vulnerabilities are those, sometimes innocuous, components and links that have the 
potential to be show-stoppers for an organisation.  They should be identified as quickly as 
possible and as part of an integrated vulnerability assessment.  Further, matrices can be 
produced to look at different aspects of an organisation, concentrating on human resources, 
external stakeholder links, or essential infrastructure for example.  They can also be used to 
look at keystone vulnerabilities for different business units or departments and compared to 
overall vulnerability for the entire organisation.     
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(a) Vulnerability 
Matrix showing 
organisational 
components in an 
all-hazards 
context.  Circles 
represent 
components.  
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(b) Vulnerability 
Matrix showing 
organisational 
components in a 
context specific 
matrix.  Circle size 
represents 
susceptibility to a 
given context. 
 
Figure 1. Sample vulnerability matrices showing (a) an all-hazards approach and (b) a context specific 
approach to determine keystone vulnerabilities for organisational resilience. 
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Many of the larger organisations commented on the difficulties 
of informing and engaging staff in planning strategies for 
emergency management, particularly regarding pandemic (staff 
not wanting to know, decision makers not wanting to frighten 
staff unnecessarily etc).   
Few organisations had made any effort to increasing the 
awareness of key decision makers about staff issues. 
Staff Communications
It appears that few organisations consider their staff as 
stakeholders, and as such the awareness of employee fears and 
expectations in a crisis are very poorly understood.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Prioritisation of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
The Vulnerability Matrix is divided into four categories of vulnerability.  The highest 
vulnerability category is in the top right-hand quadrant moving through to the lowest 
vulnerability in the bottom left-hand quadrant (Figure 1).  For the ‘all-hazards’ matrix, all 
organisational components that fall within the highest vulnerability categories on the matrix are 
likely to be the most important keystone vulnerabilities and should be the ones addressed first 
in any planning strategies.  In Figure 1 (a) the matrix shows that components #6 and #1 would 
be considered as the most important followed by #4, #10 and #2, then #9, #8 and #3.     
Organisations assessing vulnerability for a specific crisis also interpret the susceptibility 
information.  Components that leave a large ‘hole’ in the highest vulnerability category on the 
matrix are likely to be the most significant keystone vulnerabilities for that particular event.  In 
Figure 1 (b), the susceptibility information has been imposed on the vulnerability matrix.  In this 
example component #1 is more of a keystone vulnerability in this type of event than #6 
because it represents a larger ‘hole’ in the matrix within the same vulnerability category (in 
Figure 1 (a) these components would have been considered relatively equally).  Components 
#4 and possibly #2 also present as significant keystone vulnerabilities, and would be 
addressing before component #1; principally because of the size of the ‘holes’ they leave in 
the matrix.  In this way the organisation can more specifically target those components that 
present the greatest keystone vulnerabilities for the particular context of concern.  
 
2.5 Element 5 – Increasing Adaptive Capacity 
The final stage in the Resilience Management process focuses predominantly, but not 
exclusively, on identifying and developing adaptive capacity in an organisation.  Adaptive 
capacity is largely concerned with the cultural capital of an organisation and there are several 
detailed methodologies in existence to measure some of the psychological aspects of this 
culture (for a review see Chernyshenko and Stark, 2005).  It may be difficult for organisations 
to incorporate these methodologies into their day-to-day business due to the complexity of 
these models, financial constraints and the availability and skill of staff to perform the 
assessments.  For this reason, the tools in Element 5 are designed to provide a time and 
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resource efficient way to assess and improve overall resilience for organisations via 
developing adaptive capacity, without getting lost in too much detail.   
Element 5 is intended to provide tangible outcomes for organisations, and assist them in 
developing immediate action plans to address key resilience issues, particularly in relation to 
adaptive capacity, but also in terms of situation awareness and keystone vulnerabilities. 
 
2.5.1 Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS) 
Ultimately, the Resilience Management process is about providing simple and practical tools 
for decision makers to assess and increase an organisation’s resilience for times of crisis.  The 
Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS) is one such tool.   
REDS encourage organisations to experience their vulnerabilities and strengths in a simulated 
crisis setting and offer a platform from which to critically assess decision making and 
communications.  Scenario exercises help an organisation to increase its awareness of the 
operating environment in a crisis and the potential impacts of different event types.  For those 
organisations that have engaged in producing emergency plans or business continuity 
planning, simulations offer an excellent opportunity to test these plans before they are needed 
in a real situation. 
Ideally REDS are conducted with groups of between 8-12 individuals who have wide ranging 
knowledge of the organisation and represent key decision makers.  REDS can be modified for 
smaller organisations, but for larger organisations, groups should number no more than 12.  
Additional exercises should be conducted if more people are to be involved.   
REDS are structured into six distinct operational stages and are conducted sequentially.  
These stages are described in Table 4 below.  Using REDS on a regular basis, with different 
consequence scenarios as the basis for each exercise, can help to highlight some of the 
cultural strengths and weaknesses in an organisation.  REDS also help the organisation to 
assess and subsequently improve its capacity to meet its obligations in various crisis 
situations.   
Participants are responsible for all outputs from the REDS and are encouraged to write 
everything down onto wall charts to help structure their thinking during the exercise.  
Additionally, it is important to have impartial observers to help facilitate the REDS.  During 
REDS it is possible for an observer to determine the (relative) level of awareness about 
hazards and the potential impacts on the organisation resulting from these hazards.  
Observers can also:  
• Observe the decision making process in action. 
• See how well the decision makers understand minimum operating requirements. 
• See how well decision makers communicate the minimum operating requirements to 
other decision makers. 
• Assess levels of awareness regarding roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders. 
• Encourage participants to view the simulated crisis situation both from an internal and 
external perspective. 
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• Assess the organisation’s awareness of its connection with stakeholders and the 
impacts that may arise from disturbance to these links. 
• Assess the organisation’s strategic vision and purpose and how well this is understood 
throughout the organisation.  
REDS is an excellent way to provide the necessary context for making vulnerability 
assessments.  REDS allows stakeholders and decision makers (both internally and externally) 
to actually experience these vulnerabilities in an environment simulating a real emergency.  
REDS help organisations to see not only their own vulnerabilities more clearly (and in context), 
but also the potential vulnerabilities in other linked organisations or systems. 
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The REDS Process 
Stage 1. Group Selection and Scenario Presentation 
If the group numbers more than eight individuals, it should be divided into two smaller 
groups with equal numbers.  The groups are presented with a detailed event scenario 
and are asked to consider this event from a specific time frame for the immediate 
response phase.  (This may be minutes, hours, or days depending on the nature of 
the event). 
Stage 2. The Response Phase 
Each group is asked to consider the following four questions. 
o Question 1.  What are the major issues facing the organisation at this time 
(following the crisis)?  This encourages the group to brainstorm all the potential 
problems that the organisation faces to ensure that the full scope of the problem is 
identified. 
o Question 2.  What are the main priorities that the organisation must consider?  
The participants must plan what they actually need to do, how, in what order and 
who will be responsible for what actions. 
o Question 3.  What are the lesser priorities and how long until these become 
critical?  This offers participants an opportunity to view the crisis from alternative 
time frames.  This question encourages participants to do a horizon scan of the 
issues and to consider within what time frame these are likely to become 
important? 
o Question 4.  What could the organisation do prior to a crisis to better prepare for 
this situation?  This question is designed to produce an action-plan that can be 
immediately developed by the organisation to improve its resilience.  Here the 
participants are asked to consider the most significant gaps in the response 
approach during the REDS and what they could do prior to an event to minimise 
their impact on the organisation.  As part of the action-plan approach, time frames 
for implementing the plan should also be considered. 
Stage 3. Break and Review 
Participants are encouraged to take a break from the exercise and facilitators can 
offer comments on how the groups are doing, as well as suggest tips and advice for 
improvement.  This is a valuable chance for participants to reflect on how well they 
achieved what they were asked to do, and how they might improve their performance, 
individually and as a group. 
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The REDS Process (ctd) 
Stage 4. The Recovery Phase 
Groups are then brought together for the recovery phase of the REDS.  Each group is 
given an overview of the scenario from a different time perspective.  Typically this 
time frame is well into the organisational recovery from the event.  Participants are 
asked to consider the same questions as in Stage 2, using the new scenario time 
frame and taking into consideration the comments and advice given during the break 
in Stage 3. 
Stage 5. The External Perspective 
In the recovery phase of the exercise one individual from each group is taken aside 
and asked to consider the scenario from the perspective of one or more key 
stakeholder groups.  These perspectives are later presented as part of a debriefing to 
determine if the organisation adequately considered these stakeholders and their 
concerns/ demands/ expectations. 
Stage 6. Debriefing and Action Plans 
At the conclusion of the REDS, the participants take part in a group debriefing.  
Debriefing is very important and a way for the organisation to create an action plan 
that can be addressed immediately.  The action plan can quickly reduce vulnerability 
as well as improve awareness, adaptive capacity and therefore overall organisational 
resilience.  Creating an action plan at the conclusion of the REDS has another 
benefit; it can capitalise on the momentum and enthusiasm of participants that often 
arises from these exercises. 
Table 4.  Description of the six stages of REDS to improve organisational resilience. 
 
2.6  Synthesis 
The Resilience Management process described above has been developed in conjunction with 
ten case-study organisations.  The steps are used to increase overall resilience by improving 
situation awareness, advancing the identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities 
and increasing adaptive capacity.  The tools that have been developed and used in each step 
have been instrumental in gathering valuable data about common resilience issues for 
organisations in New Zealand.  These issues are the subject of the next section in this report 
and are subsequently used to develop resilience profiles for each of the case-study 
organisations. 
 
 
Resilient Organisations 19 www.resorgs.org.nz  
  
3 Resilience Indicators 
All of the case-study organisations were analysed to identify resilience issues that are 
common to many organisations, independent of size or sector.  This discussion details these 
issues and categorises them according to the attributes of resilience; situation awareness, 
management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity.  These resilience indicators 
are shown in Table 5.  For each organisation in this study, the indicators were assessed to 
produce a relative resilience profile and these will be discussed in the following section.   
It is important to recognise the relationships between the indicators in each section.  
Situation awareness has influence over the performance of an organisation in identifying and 
managing keystone vulnerabilities, and both of these influence adaptive capacity for 
organisations.  Where possible, the following discussion details specific issues but the reader 
is urged to be mindful of these intrinsic inter-relationships. 
 
Resilience Indicators 
Situation Awareness Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities Adaptive Capacity 
SA1
Roles and 
Responsibilities KV1 Planning Strategies AC1 Silo Mentality 
SA2
Understanding of 
Hazards and 
Consequences  
KV2
Participation in 
Exercises AC2
Communications and 
Relationships 
SA3
Connectivity 
Awareness KV3
Capability and 
Capacity of Internal 
Resources 
AC3
Strategic Vision and 
Outcome Expectancy 
SA4 Insurance Awareness KV4
Capability and 
Capacity of External 
Resources 
AC4
Information and 
Knowledge 
SA5 Recovery Priorities KV5
Organisational 
Connectivity AC5
Leadership, 
Management and 
Governance Structures 
Table 5.  Summary of the 15 Resilience Indicators. 
 
3.1  Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness refers to an organisation’s awareness of its entire operating system, 
including threats and opportunities, connectivity and internal and external stakeholders.  A 
total of five resilience indicators were identified under the banner of situation awareness and 
these are discussed below. 
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3.1.1 Roles and Responsibilities (SA1) 
A key awareness issue for all organisations in this study was that of roles and 
responsibilities.  This translates to the knowledge of one’s own role in the organisation as 
well as knowledge of roles and responsibilities of others in the organisation.  The symptoms 
of poor awareness of roles and responsibilities included: 
• Staff feeling undervalued,  
• Staff not being consulted in areas where they had expertise,  
• Increasing levels of mistrust of decision makers, and  
• Feelings of disengagement with the organisational vision.   
 
Who, What, Where and How?
Almost all of the organisations displayed significant 
shortcomings with knowledge of roles and responsibilities 
in day-to-day operations.  Those organisations that had 
experienced crises in the past also indicated that these 
problems were exacerbated in stressful situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Many organisations had difficulty in balancing the desire for autonomous decision making 
and decentralisation with maintaining essential connections between staff, particularly where 
there is a significant geographic distribution of offices and staff.  Even in organisations where 
the geographic distribution of offices was not a factor, staff in different departments often had 
little or no knowledge of what others in the organisation were doing, or the potential roles that 
they might play in a crisis.  This was a surprising outcome at an executive level in some of 
the case-studies, and is thought to reflect an underlying silo mentality in these organisations 
(Silo mentality is described in Section 3.3.1 below).  Only one organisation did not appear to 
have a significant problem with knowledge of roles and responsibilities.  This is thought to be 
partially due to the relatively small number of staff, a single office environment, and a ‘family’ 
philosophy in decision making where all staff are expected and encouraged to contribute to 
finding solutions for problems. 
Another aspect of this issue is the strict definition of roles and responsibilities in an 
organisation, and a strong adherence to these descriptions.  Two organisations exhibited this 
clearly.  In both, staff have very defined roles in the organisational structure and their 
mandate for decision making, and associated responsibilities, are clearly spelled out.  These 
employees tend to work strictly within the boundaries of these roles and seem to be very 
reluctant to step outside of these.  Not only does this appear to be a barrier to the flow of 
knowledge in the organisation, especially of the roles, responsibilities and expectations of 
others in the organisation, but also reduces the flexibility of the organisation from a decision 
making perspective.  This, in turn, has an impact on the organisation’s adaptive capacity. 
The impact of awareness of roles and responsibilities for external stakeholders are discussed 
in Section 3.1.3. 
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3.1.2 Understanding of Hazards and Consequences (SA2) 
Some case-study organisations had a good awareness of both the impacts and risks for 
some hazards.  These were typically high profile potential events or events already 
experienced by the organisation, for example a major earthquake, the threat of influenza 
pandemic outbreak or a high intensity rainstorm or flood.  Overall, however, there was a 
limited awareness of the range of hazards the organisations may be exposed to as well as 
the potential impacts of these events.  Furthermore, there was also a poor understanding of 
how manageable these events could be.  Even those organisations displaying the highest 
situation awareness tended to be reactionary in their dealing with crises, and this is partially 
a function of a low awareness of what threats and opportunity these events may present.   
The awareness of high profile events was also limited for many organisations.  Those 
organisations that had experience of significant crises were very aware of the problems 
associated with any reoccurrence of these events.  However, despite good planning in some 
instances, the planning was very event specific and there was little consideration of 
extending the planning to incorporate other events with similar consequences.   
Many of the organisations in this study had a good awareness of potential pandemic 
outbreaks and some had invested time in planning for such an event.  However, none of 
these organisations had considered the long-term effects of large scale human resources 
shortages in such an event.  Furthermore discussion of pandemic typically exposed a 
perception that pandemic is largely irrelevant as a potential threat.  While some organisations 
had considered what the consequences might be if New Zealand’s borders were closed, few 
interviewees believed that this would actually happen.   
 
Another organisation discussing the consequences of an 
earthquake were of the view that the ‘ground would just turn 
to water and we would all be toast’. 
It’s a Disaster!
One organisation, when faced with the loss of 
telecommunications networks for a week, claimed that they 
would simply shut up shop and go home with absolutely no 
consideration of what they would do once the service was 
restored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the high awareness and the wealth of information available to organisations 
regarding planning for pandemic, little had been done by most.  There were some 
exceptions; two organisations had pandemic plans in place, or were developing them.  
However, even in these organisations decision makers had not considered the applicability of 
their pandemic planning to other potential hazard events, or attempted to expand planning 
into an all-hazards approach.  One organisation claimed that it was embarking on an all-
hazards planning strategy but there was little evidence that it was successful in this. 
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3.1.3 Connectivity Awareness (SA3) 
Most of the organisations in this study had a good awareness and understanding of their 
immediate operating environment and the impacts of the loss of key customers, key 
suppliers and other critically linked organisations.  However, an advanced awareness of their 
connectivity with the entire community of stakeholders was not widely observed.  Several 
organisations claimed that they had a good understanding of the expectations and limitations 
of their stakeholders, but as the study progressed this understanding was shown to be more 
limited than anticipated.  For example, some organisations highlighted that they have no 
ability to monitor customer’s satisfaction, movement or demand, and have no substantial 
awareness of what might be expected by these customers in various types of crises.   
The awareness of internal stakeholders was also limited in most of the organisations and few 
considered their staff as stakeholders.  Only one organisation specifically gathered 
information about the fears and expectations of staff, using staff engagement surveys.  The 
size of the organisation appeared to be significant in the degree of awareness of internal 
stakeholders; the smaller the organisation (number of employees) the greater the 
awareness.  One organisation was making an effort to engage with staff by making them 
responsible for planning and business continuity in individual offices.  However on the other 
hand, some key decision makers in another organisation viewed staff as a potential liability in 
a crisis. 
 
3.1.4 Insurance Awareness (SA4) 
The knowledge of levels of business interruption insurance (although not all organisations in 
this study had such cover), the availability of other insurance products and other aid options 
varied considerably in the case-study organisations.  In most organisations this knowledge 
only extended to an assumption that there was some level of coverage or aid available, but 
few knew any details of what this involved.  Most participants in this study assumed that 
financial assistance would be immediately accessible following a crisis, and also that 
insurance or government aid for example would provide adequate coverage for the duration 
of the event and expected recovery.  After discussions during interviews and REDS some 
participants commented that the current expectations were inadequate for the duration of 
several types of events.  In addition, there is a general lack of awareness of the expected 
limited availability of damage assessors and other professionals to process insurance claims 
in a large scale physical event. 
 
3.1.5 Recovery Priorities (SA5) 
Another important component in situation awareness is the level of understanding about 
minimum business requirements and organisational recovery priorities.  All of the 
organisations in this study had a limited awareness of what might be required of them in a 
large scale, or long duration disaster.  Several of the case-study organisations were very 
introspective and had little awareness of the ability of other organisations to meet their needs  
These same organisations had a poor perception of the importance of their own needs over 
the needs of others in the wider community; organisations or individuals.  While most of the 
case-studies seemed to have a clear understanding of their business priorities during day-to-
day operations, this was not apparent from a crisis perspective.   
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Only one organisation clearly identified its key response and recovery priorities and the 
relationship with business continuity.  In contrast, another organisation was unable to identify 
key recovery priorities, and did not have a clear idea of minimum operating requirements 
following a crisis.  This was true for most of the organisations. 
Many organisations make the incorrect assumption that key 
priorities are well understood, particularly amongst the 
executive or senior management teams.  These assumptions are 
often exposed during exercises, which highlights that these 
priorities are actually only common knowledge for individual 
departments and not the organisation as a whole. 
The Main Priorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
This section discusses common issues surrounding the identification and management of 
keystone vulnerabilities and their impact on overall organisational resilience.  Keystone 
vulnerabilities are those components of an organisational system that have the potential to 
cause the greatest negative impact, either catastrophically or insidiously.  The following 
discussion divides keystone vulnerabilities up into a set of five indicators as described below. 
 
3.2.1 Planning Strategies (KV1) 
Several of the organisations in this study have ongoing risk identification processes and have 
engaged in some emergency and recovery planning.  These are typically the larger 
organisations in terms of employee numbers and often have the backing or driving force of a 
parent company, or even other organisations within the industry.  Often when the planning 
process is directed by (but not performed by) the parent company it is considered to only 
have partial relevance to the organisation at a local level.  As highlighted in Section 3.1.2 
above, often planning centres on a small number of specific events or risks.  Only one 
organisation claimed that it was attempting an all-hazards approach with its planning 
strategies, but even in this organisation evidence suggested that the focus was on a small 
number of specific events.  One of the smaller organisations indicated that it was not even 
aware of relevant risk management standards in New Zealand.   
There appeared to be a handful of drivers for organisations in terms of risk management and 
planning.   
• One case-study organisation indicated that it was engaging in business continuity 
planning because of insurance company demands.  This business was enthusiastic 
about creating a business continuity plan in order to potentially reduce its business 
interruption insurance premiums.  However there were significant reservations in the 
organisation about the effectiveness of this as a driver.   
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• In several organisations the increasing awareness of pandemic proved a clear driver 
for planning.  However, as previously mentioned, this planning was specifically for 
pandemic, and not extended to include other related hazards or similar hazards at a 
variety of scales.   
• Directives from other linked organisations or from the parent company were also 
identified as drivers for planning.   
• Some of the organisations in this study have a mutual working relationship for day-to-
day operations, and thus the planning strategies of one organisation have the 
potential to impact on the other.  Also, the parent company or group has an influence 
on the implementation of risk management and other planning strategies.  Again, 
there are concerns that the lack of an internal driver for planning has a negative 
impact on the enthusiasm for the planning process as well as engagement with all 
stakeholders. 
The vision of what an emergency plan or business continuity plan should consist of was also 
a contentious issue in this study.  Typically the problems arose when different decision 
makers in an organisation had different visions of the structure of the plan and planning 
process and what the end product should be; a detailed collection of specific tasks and 
actions for every conceivable event or a simple list of contact details for key stakeholders. 
 
3.2.2 Participation in Exercises (KV2) 
Participation in exercises for emergency management is typically restricted in most 
organisations to fire evacuation drills on a regular (6-12 monthly) basis.  However, for some 
of the organisations in this study, participation in either in-house or externally managed 
exercises is a regular part of the planning process.  During this study the researcher was 
able to observe three of the case-study organisations in independent exercises.  Two 
organisations participated in an exercise at a regional scale and another ran its own in-house 
exercise during the interview phase of the study.   
The value of exercises for emergency management and business recovery is perceived 
differently by different people and organisations in this study.  Exercises, in the form of 
REDS, were an integral part of this research, and engagement of organisations was often 
difficult to secure.  Overall, organisations claimed that a major barrier to exercising plans was 
the availability of appropriate staff, as well as an unwillingness to have any impact on day-to-
day business, albeit short-term.  One organisation expressed a significant reluctance to 
exercise claiming that it was not confident in the ability of its plan to meet the demands of the 
exercise. 
To Plan or not to Plan:  that is the question. 
One organisation claimed that its experience in real world 
events meant that it did not have to exercise.  This 
organisation was very focused on previous experiences, and 
was largely unaware of the benefits that could be gained 
taking these experiences into their planning processes.  The 
danger for this organisation was that without exercises, 
positive lessons from the past would not be transferred to 
future event management, or to new staff and stakeholders. 
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3.2.3 Capability and Capacity of Internal Resources (KV3) 
The following discussion about internal resources is subdivided into three components; 
physical resources, human resources and process resources.  Physical resources include 
buildings and other structures, internal services and critical contents and equipment.  Human 
resources involve the capability and capacity of employees in the organisation.  Process 
resources include the capability and capacity of economic and administrative resources. 
Buildings and Structures 
• A substantial proportion of case-study organisations had no planning in place for 
alternative office space.  Most had made significant assumptions regarding the 
continuation of critical services, and also had high expectations about their ability to 
work remotely in a crisis.  Additionally all of the organisations had not considered 
limitations on the availability of external trades-people and professionals to assist in 
rebuilding following a crisis.  While some organisations had made significant efforts 
towards ensuring that their chosen emergency operations centres were well 
equipped, there were some potentially disastrous omissions or assumptions made.  
Many of these related to the availability of essential services (water, electricity, 
telecommunications etc) for these operations centres. 
• Few organisations had enough understanding of co-dependencies between internal 
services.  Information technology is a case in point.  Several organisations had 
identified the potential for failure of critical information systems, and had chosen to 
create backup systems, some even in different cities.  However the impact of the loss 
of electricity for these technology services was not widely recognised.  While some of 
the organisations had purchased diesel generators to provide continued electricity for 
some key functions, only a few people knew which functions these were.  
Interestingly, some of the smallest organisations in this study had generators 
compared to larger organisations. 
Human Resources  
• The importance of human resources is highly regarded by all of the case-study 
organisations.  However, many of these organisations do not have a full appreciation 
for how difficult it may be to engage, retain, recruit or support staff in the aftermath of 
a crisis.  Most of the organisations had considered the pandemic scenario prior to 
their participation in this study and some had engaged in specific planning for 
pandemic.  However, few of these organisations had a full understanding of the 
extent of the potential human resources shortage, or the duration over which this 
might be a problem.  Other types of crises were largely overlooked from a human 
resources perspective.   
• For most organisations, the loss of human resources would probably be the result of 
death, injury or mental trauma in the aftermath of a physical emergency, for example 
an earthquake, a fire or an explosion.  The impacts on staff as a result of reputation 
impacts (fraud, health and safety problems, and legal proceedings) were typically not 
regarded by any of the organisations other than in passing.  This limited the levels of 
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engagement with staff, and potentially has negative impacts for the organisation in 
communicating with staff in a crisis. 
• The issue of an ageing workforce and a workforce that is increasingly unwilling to do 
manual work is also a problem for some organisations.  
• Succession of staff from an emergency management perspective was shown to be a 
significant issue.  Some of the organisations have clearly identified successors for 
key senior staff and decision makers, even if this has not been translated into a 
formal planning process.  Two organisations favour identifying the most appropriate 
people for an emergency situation based on the nature of the event.  However this 
technique was not observed during the REDS for one of these organisations.  Often 
some of the most important individuals for crisis management are those who have a 
vast or critical knowledge and these people are typically not included in any 
succession planning.  Mentoring is often disregarded because of the availability of 
suitable staff, and the economics of having two or more people learning the same job. 
 Whose turn is it now?
One organisation has already been through the trauma of a 
major event and identified the problems associated with 
not having a roster system in place for emergency staff.  
Despite the recognition of this significant problem, one 
year after the event, this organisation had still not put 
any structure in place to remedy this situation. 
 
 
 
 
     
• There are also issues related to the strategic vision of an organisation and the 
succession of staff in a crisis, particularly at a decision making level.  During the 
exercise with one particular organisation staff were very reluctant to express their 
strategic objectives for the emergency response.  Decision makers in this 
organisation had not adequately considered the impacts of large scale events, 
particularly physical crises, nor had they made provision for adequate numbers of 
staff to manage such an event.  
• Very few of the organisations in this study had considered that crises may occur 
coincidently with a need to continue business-as-usual and what this might mean 
from a human resources perspective.  During the debriefing with one organisation, 
the designated emergency controller expressed his surprise at how many people 
were needed in the emergency operations centre to ensure the smooth management 
of the event.  Typically the organisations in this study were unprepared for the 
demands placed on staff in a crisis, and for the numbers of staff that may be required 
as well as where additional staff may be sourced from. 
Process Resources 
• The standardisation of systems and procedures for organisations is a resilience 
issue.  The creation of systems and procedures that extend across an organisation 
are typically seen as favourable.  However, some organisations that did have these 
available chose not to use them because they were seen as not being applicable, 
having been developed by a parent or other linked company.  In contrast, 
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organisations that did have effective, well communicated and flexible systems and 
procedures that were understood by the entire organisation were typically better 
equipped for crisis than those that did not.   
• An organisation’s financial position, its economic stability and that of any relevant 
parent or governing organisation were identified as significant strengths.  Those 
organisations that had no debt, a large balance sheet, or the availability of large 
amounts of money in a relatively short period were often more flexible and creative 
with their decision making processes.  However, there were some notable exceptions 
where an organisation’s assumption of the resources available to it seems to foster 
an air of complacency in decision making during a crisis. 
 
3.2.4 Capability and Capacity of External Resources (KV4) 
The capability and capacity of external resources highlight concerns for organisations.  The 
development of systems and protocols to reduce these vulnerabilities is very much related to 
the organisation’s awareness of its role and its connectivity with key stakeholders.  It is also 
related to an organisation’s overall recovery priorities as well as the limitations and 
expectations of linked organisations.  The following discussion focuses on the expected 
availability of external resources for the organisations and the degree of preparation for the 
loss of external services and supplies/equipment.  
External Assistance 
• For most of these organisations there was little or no consideration that other 
organisations would be seen as more important from both a response and recovery 
perspective in a large scale event.  There were some exceptions to this; one 
organisation viewed itself as a critical lifeline and was attempting to engage with 
critically linked external organisations.  However, this view was not necessarily 
supported by these organisations.  Another organisation considered that its role in 
community recovery was considerably less than the expectations of the community 
itself. 
 
The organisations all appeared to have expectations of 
emergency services, government agencies and Civil Defence 
that are disproportionate with the support these 
organisations could reasonably offer, particularly in a large 
scale emergency.  Many organisations do not have an accurate 
vision of their own importance in the community and expect 
that support would be immediately available; extra staff, 
water supplies, builders, insurance assessors.
The Knights in Shining Armour  
 
 
 
 
 
Services 
• Electricity was the critical service that all organisations were acutely aware of as a 
keystone vulnerability, closely followed by telecommunications and information 
technology services.  Transportation was considered a vital service for some types of 
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events for all case-study organisations, and from a recovery perspective water and 
sewerage services were critical.  However, many of the organisations in this study did 
not have a full awareness of what the loss of these services might mean to continued 
operations.  Therefore they did not adequately plan for either the loss of services or 
for continued operations once services were restored.  Several organisations had 
considered or purchased backup generators to ensure the continuation of electrical 
supply to key parts of the business.  One organisation claimed that it was too difficult 
to get resource consent and other permits to install a generator, and that the cost of 
this process was prohibitive.  Other organisations with generators identified that the 
availability of fuel to run the generator was critical.  There was no formal planning for 
continuation of fuel supply by any of the organisations in this study.  Most 
organisations with generators had partially tested their generators, but there was a 
significant amount of disagreement within most of these organisations regarding what 
the generators were actually providing power for. 
• A key problem for organisations in planning for service outages is the perception that 
they cannot control when they happen or their duration.  This appears to encourage a 
climate of disempowerment in organisations regarding planning for service outages 
which extends through to limited planning for the return of services to the 
organisation.  The lack of planning therefore is heavily influenced by the 
organisation’s awareness of the severity of the event and a tendency for limited 
strategic thinking and a ‘fighting fires’ approach to emergency management planning. 
Supply Network 
• The degree to which organisations plan for continued supply of essential goods and 
services is also identified as a significant keystone vulnerability issue.  Only one 
organisation had approached its most critical suppliers and attempted to establish 
preferential supply in a crisis situation.  This same organisation also had well 
established and ongoing relationships with a communications consultant for media 
management in a crisis.    Some organisations identified that their most important 
suppliers and consultants were likely to be limited in their ability to provide support in 
a crisis, but these organisations had made no steps to ensuring the services of 
alternative organisations, or establishing preferential service agreements. 
 
 
Most organisations in this study believed that their day-to-
day relationships with critically linked organisations 
(including customers and competitors) were excellent and 
that this would be enough to ensure a continuation of 
expected levels of service and communications in a crisis.   
None of the organisations had considered in any detail the 
problems associated with a large scale crisis; for example, 
the availability of builders, plumbers and electricians or 
the availability of damage assessors for insurance in a 
large scale regional wide earthquake. 
But we have an agreement…
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3.2.5 Organisational Connectivity (KV5) 
Some organisations seemed to have excellent relationships and a good understanding of the 
connectivity to other critical organisations in day-to-day operations.  However, there was 
significantly less thought put into how to maintain these relationships in a crisis.  Even with a 
clear understanding of the relationships between contractors, suppliers, consultants and 
staff, for example, very few organisations had actually formally (or even semi-formally) 
engaged in planning to address these issues. 
As previously mentioned, most organisations in this study believed that their day-to-day 
connections would be the same ones they would need in a crisis.  Only one organisation had 
considered a different perspective and was actively approaching emergency management 
agencies to establish contacts.  Some organisations had ongoing relationships with the 
emergency response organisations.  This was due to their regular participation in multi-
organisational exercises or because of their role in the community.  Those organisations that 
viewed their contribution to society as being critical to emergency response and/or recovery 
typically had endeavoured to establish emergency relationships with key response 
organisations like Civil Defence.   
 
3.3  Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive capacity includes the elements that make up the culture of an organisation and that 
allow it to make decisions in both a timely and appropriate manner in a crisis as well as to 
identify and maximise opportunities.  The indicators of adaptive capacity identified in this 
study are discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 Silo Mentality (AC1) 
The concept of silo mentality is not new.  It has been widely recognised in the literature (for 
example see Gill, (2006), Davidson, (2005), and Hasanali, (2002)) and in organisations often 
represents a decentralised structure, an individualistic approach to achieving goals, and a 
limited understanding of the overall vision of the organisation.  Typically, silo mentality is 
viewed as a feature of organisations that experience considerable growth (Cote, 2002), but in 
this study, silo mentality was observed in all of the case-studies irrespective of their size. 
The incidence of silo mentality in organisations was not unexpected.  However, the degree to 
which silo mentality appears to underpin many critical aspects of organisational resilience 
was a significant feature of this study.  The occurrence of silo mentality is perceived as being 
something that organisations are both unable and unwilling to remove.  It is an intrinsic 
feature of the autonomous decision making structures that feature in modern organisations, 
and is important for ensuring loyalty and pride, as well as competition, into an organisational 
framework.  However, the negative aspects of silo mentality appear to be poorly identified 
and largely misunderstood by the organisations in this study.  These effects include:  
• poor knowledge of roles and responsibilities of others in the organisation,  
• poorly understood and utilised communications pathways,  
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• destructive and detrimental relationships developing both internally and externally,  
• non-transparent governance and decision making structures, and 
• low levels of trust and loyalty from staff and others.   
It is important therefore to realise the impact of silo mentality on the overall resilience for 
organisations.  For example, one organisation had identified the negative impacts that silo 
mentality was having on staff and on the overall work environment.  Decision makers chose 
to address this at executive levels, hoping that the positive spin-offs would filter down to 
other levels in the organisation.  This approach was not apparently successful and the 
negative effects of silo mentality were having a profound impact.  Other organisations 
claimed that silo mentality had no great influence on operations and on decision making.  
However, the symptoms of negative silo mentality were evident, particularly during the REDS 
and other crisis exercises.  These manifested in an observed lack of respectful 
communications, poorly understood roles and responsibilities, unrealistic expectations of key 
stakeholders, to name a few. 
 
3.3.2 Communications and Relationships (AC2) 
As mentioned above, the effectiveness of communications and relationships in an 
organisation is influenced by the negative aspects of silo mentality.  The importance of 
creating effective communications pathways based on mutually respectful relationships is 
apparent to all organisations in this study.  However, while most of the organisations 
recognise that these communications and relationships issues are a problem, the full extent 
of their potential impact on the organisation in a crisis is largely unrecognised.  There were 
some exceptions, mainly those organisations that experience small scale crises on a 
relatively regular basis but even these organisations had a limited understanding of the 
potential impact in a large scale emergency.    
Internal communications and relationships were viewed as problematic, particularly for 
general staff seeking to communicate upwards in the organisation.  Typically, between senior 
and executive staff, communications and relationships were viewed as healthy and effective.  
These senior staff also viewed their communications to general staff as effective.  Those that 
did recognise problems in communication strategies at different levels of the organisation 
were doing very little to encourage engagement and ensure a better understanding of staff 
expectations and limitations. 
Let them eat cake…
The senior decision makers in one organisation clearly understood 
the need to engage with the general staff, and were endeavouring to 
break down the silo mentality by ensuring that staff at all levels 
in the organisation had breaks in the same cafeteria.  A previous 
arrangement of one cafeteria for general staff and one for 
administrative staff was viewed negatively by most in the 
organisation.  Therefore, a larger single café was being built to 
accommodate all staff on site.  This was seen as a key action to 
improve relationships, enhance communications and begin to break 
down the negative impacts of silo mentality. 
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The awareness of roles and responsibilities has an influence on the development of effective 
communications and relationships.  Several organisations in this study had offices and sites 
distributed throughout New Zealand and internationally.  In most instances, staff do not move 
between offices and therefore an understanding of the key resilience issues including roles 
and responsibilities for different sites is limited.  From an emergency communications 
perspective this has a negative impact on organisational resilience.   
But geography is not the only barrier to resilience; it can be observed between departments 
in some organisations.  One organisation had employees in different departments that had 
excellent communications and relationships internally.  But communications across 
departments was fraught with difficulty.  This was partially because there were no common or 
reciprocal strategies linking departments and employees were not confident that their 
communications needs would be met by these systems.  Independent systems had 
developed as a result.  This further isolated staff in department groups, perpetuating silo 
mentality.  In another organisation, strategies for emergency management were well 
established in one department (information technology) but were not communicated 
throughout the organisation.  Therefore, valuable management strategies were not being 
utilised as effectively or as extensively as possible.  Staff outside this department had almost 
no knowledge of these communications strategies. 
Clearly there is a link between effective communications pathways, respectful relationship 
development and the ability to acquire, transfer and retain critical information in a crisis.  
Most of the organisations had difficulty in addressing this problem.  Effective information 
acquisition and transfer in a crisis is vital, but can only be effective if all employees 
appreciate who will need what information, in what type of format, and in an appropriate time 
frame.  In the absence of clearly defined and efficient communications pathways most of the 
organisations in this study struggled with the successful flow of information in a crisis 
situation.  Some of the case-study organisations were working towards addressing this 
problem however.  One strategy being used to minimise the negative effects of silo mentality 
on communications and information flow was to encourage a more personal approach to 
communications; one organisation is actually quite dismissive of email communications.  
These case-study organisations generally have a wide distribution of offices and sites 
throughout New Zealand, and their senior staff members travel extensively to ensure that 
personal contact and communications are made.   
Communications and relationships with external stakeholders were also observed to be an 
issue.  Some problems stem from organisations having an inaccurate perception of their 
importance in the community of stakeholders post disaster.  Few of the case-study 
organisations had engaged in discussions with these stakeholders specifically about 
emergency response and recovery, and even less have any sort of agreement or 
memorandum of understanding in this regard.  Some of the organisations have not even 
considered how they may communicate with customers and clients in a crisis, or what sort of 
information would need to be communicated.   
Relationships and communications with the media are often overlooked from an emergency 
perspective.  Two organisations are notable in their poor understanding of clients and media 
relationships.  For both organisations this appears to originate in their perceptions of the 
organisational vision, and strategic purpose.  However, other organisations in this study have 
specific policies in place for these stakeholders, employing communications consultants to 
ensure that appropriate messages are created for particular stakeholders, and also to deal 
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with media exposure.  These organisations view this as a positive way to maintain good 
relationships with external stakeholders. 
 
3.3.3 Strategic Vision and Outcome Expectancy (AC3) 
The importance of the organisational vision for resilience was shown to be significant.  All of 
the organisations in this study had some form of defined purpose or vision statement that 
underpinned their operations.  Some organisations were driven by service to customers; 
some by supporting the community and some driven by improving the success of key 
stakeholders.  However, the operational reality and the communication of this vision 
throughout the organisation were less successful.  One organisation had two distinct groups 
representing two different organisational visions.  The result was one group always feeling 
isolated and excluded from the decision making process because they don’t perceive that 
process as representative of their organisational vision.  Another organisation had such a 
strong vision, and was so structured around this vision that it was seen to have significantly 
reduced flexibility and creativity in decision making structures. No matter what degree of 
organisational vision each case-study had, there were three critical aspects to consider from 
an adaptive capacity perspective:   
• How well is the vision articulated and communicated through the organisation?   
• How well do the day-to-day operations represent that organisational vision?   
• How well does the organisation look towards that vision for direction when engaging 
in emergency situations? 
For those organisations with a clear sense of their purpose and vision, the ability to articulate 
and communicate this throughout the organisation was evident in their day-to-day 
operations.  The impacts of a heightened situation awareness around the organisational 
vision was also an important factor; several of the case-study organisations were very clear 
about their roles in the aftermath of a crisis in terms of the wider community of stakeholders.  
Furthermore, those organisations that saw their role in the community post-crisis as integral 
to the overall recovery had a much higher expectation of their own organisational recovery.  
Some of the organisations in this study viewed their role as dispensable or unimportant for 
community recovery and had a lowered awareness of the overall organisational network.  
The outcome expectancy of these organisations was linked to this viewpoint and was 
subsequently also low; they didn’t perceive that they would be able to weather the problems 
faced.   
The use of the organisational vision as a critical crisis response tool was not widely 
recognised.  Many of the organisation commented that their approach to emergency 
management was one of ‘fighting fires’; an approach observed in several REDS and other 
exercises.  These types of response appeared to be impacted by the decision maker’s ability 
to make sense of large amounts of information in a relatively short period of time.  For those 
decision makers without the ability to look towards the organisational vision, and identify 
where the organisation should be heading in a crisis, fire fighting is the alternative.  For 
example when faced with a crisis that impacted on essential services for an extended period 
of time, the key decision maker in one organisation claimed that they would all just go home.  
After some coaching and strong suggestions by facilitators, this organisation began to use its 
Resilient Organisations 33 www.resorgs.org.nz  
  
organisational vision for customer service as a motivating force and help determine the 
emergency response, also creating an easier transition to recovery. 
 
3.3.4 Information and Knowledge (AC4) 
As previously mentioned, the strict adherence to set roles and responsibilities, and little 
motivation or expectation for staff to step outside these roles has a potentially negative 
impact on the effectiveness of communications pathways.  It also impacts on the quality of 
the information being communicated.  Two organisations in this study have a policy of 
encouraging staff to move around the organisation and to gain experience in a variety of 
roles and with a variety of responsibilities.  However, even in these organisations there were 
still individuals that held a large amount of specialised knowledge which was not readily 
accessible for others in the organisation, particularly if these ‘subject matter experts’ were 
absent.  All organisations were somewhat adverse to the introduction of additional systems 
and procedures to capture the information held by these individuals, and the availability of 
staff to participate in a mentoring program for the continuation of specialist information was 
difficult to facilitate. 
 
Moving through the ranks.
For one organisation, many members of the leadership team had 
entered the organisation as general staff and worked their way 
up to executive positions; this was encouraged in other staff 
in the organisation.  The broad knowledge of the organisation 
held by these decision makers was evident. 
 
 
 
 
 
Another aspect of information and knowledge sharing is the nature and format of information 
to be shared.  Very few organisations in this study had considered the sort of information that 
would be required to maintain an emergency response and ensure a successful recovery.  
These organisations had also given little thought to how information would be transferred to 
key people in the absence of traditional communications networks.  An illustrative example 
was during one of the emergency exercises.  This particular organisation needed to share 
information usually contained in maps and plans.  However, with the loss of 
telecommunications, the fax and internet were unavailable.  This organisation had not 
considered any alternative means for communicating this essential information in an 
emergency.  The dependence on traditional telecommunications networks is a significant 
barrier to ensuring resilience of information and knowledge sharing during a crisis. 
 
3.3.5 Leadership, Management and Governance Structures (AC5) 
One of the most important features for adaptive capacity and overall resilience in 
organisations is the way organisations are led and managed, both in day-to-day and crisis 
situations.  Organisations in this study all clearly understood the link between developing 
resilient day-to-day operations as a way to improve their resilience for emergencies and 
crisis situations.  All except one organisation expressed a strong preference for ensuring high 
levels of autonomy and decentralised decision making for day-to-day operations.  However, 
most of these organisations had not considered or planned for the changed circumstances 
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that an emergency would present from a decision making perspective; even those 
organisations that have experience of significant events.  There are several contributing 
factors.   
• Firstly, organisations in this study had little awareness and understanding of the 
consequences of events that encompass a large geographic area (multi-regional) or 
affect a very large number of people (pandemic, war, civil disruption etc).  Generally, 
their expectations for decision making in all crises is that individual offices or sites 
(even down to the scale of departments within an organisation) can continue to 
operate autonomously.   
• Secondly, many organisations displayed inadequate emergency communication 
systems, both the physical network and from an information sharing and relationships 
perspective.  The need to co-ordinate and communicate, not only with emergency 
services and civil defence organisations, but also with other offices, departments and 
decision makers within the organisation, is often not clearly appreciated.  Critical 
decisions and their expected outcomes have not been considered, and 
communications and decision making structures have not been tested.   
• Thirdly, many organisations do not have a clear view of their response and recovery 
priorities, minimum operating requirements or the support structures that are required 
to ensure these are achievable.  There were some exceptions:   
o Two organisations working together in an emergency exercise displayed a 
much clearer understanding of these requirements, but one had yet to 
translate this into emergency decision making structures.   
o Another organisation in the study had not explored the realities of how 
decision making in an emergency could continue to be successful if 
communication pathways broke down, or even if key individuals were absent.   
o Yet another of the organisations was largely unaware of its minimum 
operating requirements other than in isolated pockets within the organisation.   
o One of the other organisations believed that it had a clear mandate to make 
decisions for some specific external stakeholder groups because of the history 
of good relationships and communications built up over time.  However, this 
organisation seemed to be unaware of the expectations this bought from 
those stakeholders; that all key decisions could and would be deferred to the 
case-study organisation rather than the stakeholders taking responsibility in a 
crisis.  This is likely to break down extensively if the physical communications 
network was compromised, as there is no clear decision making structure for 
this eventuality.   
Leadership visibility, availability, and decision making transparency all have a marked impact 
on adaptive capacity.  Those organisations with the highest degree of adaptive capacity all 
showed excellent visibility of the leadership and decision making team, and all staff were 
able to communicate directly with these individuals if required.  Furthermore, the decision 
making process was relatively transparent, and was supported with good communications 
internally to all staff. 
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Access to the power.
The organisation with the least adaptive capacity in this 
study had a very rigid hierarchy for decision making, and the 
ability to communicate with the leadership team was not equal 
for all employees.  Additionally, this organisation had a 
very poor decision making transparency.  For this 
organisation staff commented that they are often frustrated 
because the degree of accountability they have for decisions 
and the input they have into making those decisions are not 
comparable, nor do decision makers adequately communicate to 
all staff why decisions are made. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4  Synthesis for Resilience Indicators 
A number of indicators of organisational resilience have arisen from the case-study 
organisations.  These organisations were selected specifically to represent the widest range 
of organisations possible to investigate the hypothesis that there are likely to be generic 
resilience indicators common to all organisations.  From the set of ten organisations studied, 
a total of 15 generic indicators have been identified which have been categorised according 
to which aspects of resilience they impact most; situation awareness, management of 
keystone vulnerabilities or adaptive capacity.  The case-study organisations have been given 
a relative rating for each indicator; comparing individual organisations with the others in this 
study.  The individual ratings have then been collated to give an overall relative rating of 
situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity for each 
organisation.  These profiles and how they are generated is the subject of the next section of 
this report.   
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4 Resilience Profiles 
The resilience profile is a relative, qualitative representation of overall resilience in an 
organisation.  An example of the resilience profile is presented in Figure 2.  Each axis on the 
resilience profile is divided equally into five categories representing the degree of situation 
awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity; very high, high, 
moderate, low and very low.  An envelope of resilience is created by joining the points along 
each axis.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Organisation with 
Very High Resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Organisation with 
Very Low Resilience 
 
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Situation Awareness 
Keystone VulnerabilitiesAdaptive Capacity 
Resilience
Resilience Envelope 
for Organisation CS9
 
Very High 
High 
Moderate 
Low 
Very Low 
Situation Awareness 
Keystone Vulnerabilities Adaptive Capacity 
Resilience Envelope for 
Organisation X. 
Figure 2.  The Resilience Profile.  For an organisation with very high resilience (a) the resilience 
envelope (blue and white hashed area on the diagram) will plot close to the apex of each axis of the 
triangle, in the very high (blue) zone.  For an organisation with very low resilience (b) the resilience 
envelope will plot much closer to the centre of the diagram for each axis. 
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As can be seen in Figure 2 (a) an organisation with a high degree of resilience will have an 
envelope of resilience that plots close to the end of each axis, and away from the centre of 
the diagram; the envelope of resilience is larger for organisations with higher resilience.  An 
organisation with low resilience will plot much closer to the centre of the triangle on each 
axis.  Figure 2 (b) shows an organisation with a low overall resilience for comparison.   
The axes for situation awareness and adaptive capacity are relatively simple to 
conceptualise; an organisation with high situation awareness or adaptive capacity will plot in 
the high zone on the diagram.  However, the axis for management of keystone vulnerabilities 
can be somewhat counter-intuitive.  The very high zone on the axis represents increased 
resilience, and therefore an organisation that plots in the very high zone for keystone 
vulnerabilities is one which has these clearly identified and well managed.   
The degree of situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerability or adaptive 
capacity is assessed on a qualitative basis by assessing the performance of an organisation 
relative to the resilience indicators.  Appendix A describes the resilience qualities observed in 
each of the ten case-study organisations and also compares their respective resilience 
profiles.  
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5 Summary and Conclusions  
5.1  Overview 
The creation of more resilient organisations has significant implications for improving 
resilience of entire communities.  This study has highlighted a set of 15 resilience indicators 
that are common to ten case-study organisations, selected to offer a wide representation of 
organisations in the New Zealand context.  In addition, this study has developed a Resilience 
Management framework for both evaluation and improving the resilience of individual 
organisations.  This framework has been created in conjunction with the case studies to 
provide a real world context and offer tangible, achievable goals for organisations seeking to 
become more resilient.   
 
5.2  Strategies for Achieving Increased Resilience 
During work with all of the case-study organisations, a set of tangible action plans were 
developed with workshop participants forming the beginnings of a strategy for improved 
resilience management.  All of these plans have been collated and the information is distilled 
into two generic resilience management strategies for organisations.  They include a resilient 
communications strategy and an emergency planning strategy.  The two strategies, 
described in Table 6 and Table 7 below, are designed to target all of the resilience indicators 
outlined in this report. 
 
Resilient Communications Strategy 
What are we all about? Ensuring everyone in the organisation understands the long-term 
organisational vision and strategy.  Identification and prioritisation of core 
business functions.  Clear delineation of the organisation’s strategic goals 
and establishing effective means for articulating this vision to all 
employees.  Further monitoring and ongoing involvement in exercises to 
ensure that the message is reaching all target groups. 
Leadership and 
Governance. 
Develop the ability of all key decision makers to have an equal voice in a 
crisis and build an understanding of the individual strengths and 
weaknesses of decision makers in the organisation. 
Stakeholder Welfare The development and maintenance of policies to ensure a clear and 
enduring understanding of the expectations and limitations of all 
stakeholders, internally and externally. 
Table 6.  Key elements of a Resilient Communications Strategy. 
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Emergency Planning Strategy 
What is important to us? Agreeing, in advance, the key priorities for the organisation in times of 
crisis and confirming that these reflect the core values of the organisation.  
Specifying minimum operating requirements.  Identifying who we rely on 
and what others expect from us.  
What could hit us and 
how bad could it be? 
A deeper understanding of the range of potential events that the 
organisation may be exposed to and the expected consequences.  This 
can involve brainstorming exercises, risk identification strategies and 
scenario creation to build awareness. 
What should our 
responses to crises be? 
Crises differ significantly from day-to-day business.  Organisations need to 
develop business-as-usual resilience which is in turn complemented by 
emergency response principles for different types of crises.  This will 
include rostering of staff, personal preparedness measures, establishing 
emergency operations centres and alternatives for crisis communications 
networks. 
What do we have at our 
disposal? 
Ensuring that the resources the organisation has available are adequately 
prepared to meet the requirements of the organisation in a crisis.  This 
may involve an inventory of internal and external resources and their 
potential limitations.  It will also involve identification of key employees and 
external stakeholders with specialist knowledge and/or skills in an 
emergency situation and may involve short term secondments or semi 
formal succession plans to build knowledge and awareness. 
What does Recovery 
mean to us? 
Recovery is rarely a discrete time frame, so organisations must consider 
how to stand down from an emergency, what external assistance may be 
available, how to assess the applicability of the strategic vision for 
potentially changed markets and environments and ongoing trauma for 
staff and external stakeholders. 
Should we participate in 
Exercises? 
Testing plans is vital as is adequately informing and training staff about 
expectations during a crisis.  Exercises can be used to test and modify 
plans, train employees and engage with key external stakeholders. 
Table 7.  Key elements of an Emergency Planning Strategy. 
 
5.3  Implementation Issues 
Resilience Management is a process that can be scaled to meet the needs of the user; it can 
be applied to individuals, small groups (for example leadership teams) or organisations of all 
sizes.  Additionally, Resilience Management can be used more collectively and tools applied 
at multi-organisational, industry sector or even community wide scales. 
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Ideally, Resilience Management will develop to a point where organisations can integrate 
resilience techniques and processes into everyday business, progressively building overall 
resilience in the face of identified and unforeseen crisis events.  Resilience Management is 
likely to require some facilitation from external experts given that not all organisations will 
have the skills and resources required for successful implementation in-house.  This is 
particularly likely to be so for micro businesses (less than 10 employees) and small-medium 
enterprises (SME’s). 
While the elements presented in this report are all important for the successful development 
of resilience in organisations, they do not have to be used in sequence or in great detail for 
some significant progress to be made.  For example, an initial survey of resilience issues is 
possible with a short round of interviewing and a survey, generating a preliminary resilience 
profile.  From this point, an organisation can decide the scale of approach, and the time 
frames that are most appropriate for it.  Further, an organisation may choose to implement 
Resilience Management as a program of REDS, engaging in different scenarios over a set 
time frame and for different groups of stakeholders to improve overall resilience.  For 
organisations that already have a working risk management system in place, the vulnerability 
assessments and matrices would identify clearly where resources could be best spent to 
address some of the keystone vulnerabilities, thereby reducing the overall identified risks. 
Because the Resilience Management process is scalable, organisations can begin the 
process at one level (for example senior management teams and decision makers) and 
move through the organisation to identify and develop resilience at other levels.  Or, an 
organisation that identifies critical resilience issues in conjunction with specific stakeholders 
can choose to implement the Resilience Management process with these groups and 
individuals. 
It is important to note that Resilience Management is not a one-off tool for the assessment 
and development of organisational resilience.  As such, it is designed to be an iterative 
system that an organisation implements at various levels and over a length of time.  
Resilience profiles, action plans and stakeholder relationships are likely to vary over time, 
and an organisation will change its resilience management plans following a crisis event.  
Therefore, organisations should not see Resilience Management as a crisis response and 
recovery tool; rather Resilience Management is a long term investment in the overall health 
and prosperity of the organisation and its community of stakeholders, including the wider 
community. 
 
5.4  Future Work 
Our research into the resilience of organisations will continue for the next three years.  
Further development of the methodology will include a more standardised approach to both 
keystone vulnerability prioritisation and for the measurement of the resilience indicators in 
organisations.  This is likely to require a more quantifiable methodology than is currently 
available.   
The extent of resilience examined in this study is limited to the case-study organisations.  It is 
unlikely that any of the case-studies are close to being the most or least resilient 
organisations possible.  Future work will include expanding the methodology to look at 
organisations that have experience with large scale disasters, as well as organisations from 
other countries to investigate the importance of cultural issues in resilience.   
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Further work also needs to be done to create maturity models of resilience; organisations 
need to have tangible and achievable goals in becoming more resilient in order to maintain 
their engagement with the process. 
The next phase of this research programme will also look to develop strategies for 
benchmarking the resilience of organisations, both within and across market sectors. 
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Appendix A. Resilience Profiles for Case-Study 
Organisations 
This research involved working with ten case-study organisations to develop and test the 
Resilience Management methodology.  The following discussion briefly outlines the key 
resilience issues for each organisation and presents their individual resilience profiles for 
comparison. 
 
CS1 – Private Manufacturer 
CS1 is a private manufacturing organisation that had the role of pilot case-study organisation 
in this research.  Overall CS1 has a moderate resilience profile (Table 8).  This arises from a 
moderate situation awareness based on limitations regarding awareness of hazards and 
impacts, and a poor understanding of stakeholders outside of its immediate operating 
environment; although CS1 understands its internal operating environment very well.  CS1 
also has a moderate ranking for keystone vulnerability identification and management.  The 
lack of preparation for the loss of electrical services and poor emergency management 
protocols outside of its IT department are significant weaknesses in this area.  As a result 
CS1 is very prone to a ‘fighting fires’ mentality when dealing with crises.  Finally, CS1 also 
has moderate adaptive capacity due principally to the difficulty of communications and 
relationships internally.  While the organisation has a very strong organisational vision, this is 
also somewhat limiting the flexibility and creativity needed in crisis decision making. 
 
CS2 – Local Authority 
CS2 is a local authority organisation consisting of less than 40 full time staff, serving a 
predominantly rural community.  As a local authority CS2 is responsible for civil defence 
responses and this was an important facet to study, particularly given CS2’s recent 
experiences with natural disaster.  Like CS1, CS2 has a moderate overall resilience (Table 
8).   
Situation awareness is the greatest weakness for CS2 with poorly communicated roles and 
responsibilities throughout the organisation.  Also, the organisation’s perception of its role in 
the community is somewhat different to community expectations.  In spite of its recent 
experiences with hazard events, CS2 also has a limited awareness of the range of hazards 
that it is exposed to and the extent of negative consequences.  However CS2 does have 
clearly identified keystone vulnerabilities contributing to its high ranking in this category.  This 
organisation has established a specialised emergency operations centre and has a generator 
for electricity outages. A strength for CS2 is its ability to gain support and resources from 
other local government and national government sources, as well as community groups and 
emergency service organisations, but these are restricted resources.  It is likely to be only 
appropriate for some types of crises.  Poor communications and a breakdown of these 
relationships in the recent crisis event is evidence for a strong silo mentality culture at CS2, 
impairing its adaptive capacity. 
 
Resilient Organisations 52 www.resorgs.org.nz  
  
CS3 – Private Contractor 
CS3 is a large private contracting firm that has offices throughout New Zealand and which 
has a very high relative resilience in this study (Table 8).   
There appears to be some issues with knowledge of roles and responsibilities throughout the 
organisation.  This issue is particularly apparent within the Head Office environment 
regarding awareness of its own role in any regional or multi-regional crisis.  Additionally, CS3 
has a clear understanding of a handful of crisis events, but planning for emergencies is 
dominated by its experience of previous crises; typically small to medium events that are 
dealt with at a regional level.  In general, CS3 has clearly identified many of its keystone 
vulnerabilities and is working towards appropriately managing them.  This includes identifying 
alternative sites for emergency co-ordination and consideration of the impacts from the loss 
of key services.  Keystone vulnerabilities identified at CS3 relate specifically to the failure of 
infrastructure networks, the availability of supplies, equipment and fuel, together with the 
understanding of contract obligations in a crisis, and the availability of services from the 
Head Office supporting the regional offices.  Typically CS3 has a high adaptive capacity 
based on an organisational culture of responsibility, autonomy and empowerment and good 
communications between staff in individual offices.  Weaknesses include communications 
that are less robust between different regional offices, and with sub-contractors and clients.  
Further, the ‘hands-off’ approach to regional management of crises and emergency planning 
by Head Office is potentially limiting for CS3. 
 
CS4 – Public Utility Provider 
CS4 is a moderately sized public utility organisation with regional offices in numerous centres 
throughout New Zealand.   
CS4’s overall resilience was shown to be high (Table 8).  While situation awareness is shown 
to be high, CS4 still has a significant issue with the understanding of roles and 
responsibilities, particularly in terms of crisis response and recovery.  However CS4 has a 
very clear understanding of its recovery priorities for itself as an organisation and from the 
perspective of its community of stakeholders.  Generally keystone vulnerabilities appear well 
managed and identified.  Prominent vulnerabilities include the fragility of the communications 
network, protocols for succession in a crisis, and the transfer of information throughout the 
organisation.  CS4 has also taken part in several training exercises for emergencies 
contributing to a very high ranking in the keystone vulnerabilities category.  In terms of 
adaptive capacity, governance and leadership at CS4 reflects a strongly autonomous culture, 
but it is one that has a limited strategic outlook in a crisis.  Additional weaknesses are 
observed prominently in communication and relationship difficulties for CS4.  Adaptive 
capacity is enhanced by CS4’s clear vision of its role in an emergency, although this is not 
always well communicated between offices internally.  Overall CS4 has moderate adaptive 
capacity. 
 
CS5 – Education Provider 
CS5 is an education provider, a large employer for the local community and has an 
established reputation both within the New Zealand context and internationally.  Compared to 
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the other organisations in this study, CS5 has a low overall resilience (Table 8) based 
predominantly on poor situation awareness, poor understanding of keystone vulnerabilities 
and limited adaptive capacity.   
Overall, there are significant issues with internal perceptions of the organisation’s core 
business which in turn affect recovery priorities.  A considerable contributing factor is a poor 
understanding of other people’s roles and responsibilities at CS5.  People are very reluctant 
to step outside of their designated roles and responsibilities to broaden their understanding 
of the rest of the organisation.  Overall, CS5 has gone some way towards identifying and 
managing its keystone vulnerabilities.  However, a poor understanding of the less operational 
vulnerabilities, a limited application of planning as exercises and training for all staff, together 
with some significant physical vulnerabilities leads to a low rating on the resilience profile.  
The most significant resilience issue for CS5 is the negative impact of a strong silo mentality 
in relation to communication, relationships and the transfer of information in the organisation.  
There is also a perceived lack of transparency in decision making; particularly where an 
employee’s ability to make decisions and their accountability for the results of those 
decisions are perceived to be at odds.  Overall, adaptive capacity at CS5 is low.   
 
CS6 – Private Wholesale Distributor 
CS6 is a wholesale distribution organisation with a reputation throughout its workforce as a 
family oriented working environment.  This organisation has a high overall resilience (Table 
8) based on moderate situation awareness, a high ranking for keystone vulnerabilities and 
very high adaptive capacity.   
CS6’s greatest weaknesses relate to a somewhat limited awareness of what key 
stakeholders may expect of the organisation in a crisis response and recovery, extending to 
awareness of the consequences of various hazards CS6 may be exposed to.  CS6 has made 
some very good progress on identifying its keystone vulnerabilities and managing them 
accordingly, due in part to the longevity of key decision makers in the organisation and their 
detailed knowledge of the business.  However, CS6 had not considered the full implications 
of the loss of electricity and the reality of a breakdown in the telecommunications network on 
a regional scale.  In addition the organisation has some very vulnerable buildings and 
equipment to some types of hazard and has not considered alternative plans for continued 
operations.  Typically CS6’s adaptive capacity is a significant strength, supported by the 
structure of the organisation and the inherent trust of key customers that provides the 
mandate to make decisions quickly and authoritatively.  Barriers to improving adaptive 
capacity at CS6 include an inability to gather appropriate information to support decision 
making in a crisis and a lack of specific strategies to disseminate this information.  In 
addition, the principal decision makers at CS6 have developed some incorrect assumptions 
about their ability to communicate effectively during a crisis. 
 
CS7 – Private Utility Provider 
CS7 is a discrete business unit within a large private organisation that has a widespread 
distribution of offices throughout New Zealand.  CS7 was shown to have a moderate relative 
overall resilience (Table 8).   
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Situation awareness at CS7 is low as a result of poor understanding of roles and 
responsibilities outside of departments and business units.  Additionally, the situation 
awareness of CS7 is let down by a poor understanding of the potential impacts of some key 
hazards and the ability of the organisation to effectively respond to them; for example the 
organisation’s expectation that it could work remotely.  Another significant weakness for CS7 
is its poor connection to customers, having no ability to map customer movement or 
demands.   CS7 has made some attempt at crisis and business continuity planning, but there 
is a significant reliance on the parent company to perform this task.  Additionally the 
organisation is heavily vulnerable to the loss of key services and also buildings and 
equipment, the loss of telecommunications services, poor staff welfare systems as well as 
the potential loss of intellectual property and security of databases and critical information.  
CS7 has an experienced team of people available through its parent company to help in the 
identification of risks and associated vulnerabilities, but due to the very autonomous nature of 
the organisation this resource is not widely utilised.  Silo mentality has become entrenched in 
the organisational structure over time, although CS7 is very well aware of this.  The greatest 
weakness in CS7 is the poor ability to make decisions in an appropriate and timely manner.  
This is primarily because the organisation does not currently have the necessary systems in 
place to ensure that the information it is gathering (either in day-to-day business or in a crisis 
situation) is accurate or appropriate for the given situation.  While CS7 is relatively agile in its 
decision making in-house, it is limited by the decision making ability of its parent company; a 
reflection on the size and structure of the parent organisation.  Adaptive capacity for CS7 is 
moderate. 
 
CS8 – Private Retailer 
CS8 is a medium sized retail operation that services a rural community in New Zealand.  
CS8 is also part of a group of other branded organisations throughout New Zealand.   CS8 is 
serviced by a wide range of organisations and is a significant social and information hub for 
the local community.  Overall resilience for CS8 was ranked as high (Table 8). 
Internally CS8 has a good awareness of individual roles and responsibilities, but there is 
almost no movement of staff between departments.  There is also a lack of understanding 
and awareness regarding hazards and impacts, both those affecting CS8 and those that 
affect the community CS8 serves.  However, CS8 has a good awareness of its importance to 
the community and to its customers and of its recovery priorities.  This awareness of the 
importance to the community may be overly positive, with CS8 seemingly unaware of the 
potential negative impacts of rumour and gossip.  Overall situation awareness at CS8 was 
moderate.  Keystone vulnerabilities were ranked as moderate with the most significant 
limitation being a reliance on the network of organisations CS8 is affiliated with from a 
decision making perspective.  CS8 has not engaged in any planning independently from its 
organisational network, and has never participated in emergency exercises other than for fire 
evacuation.  CS8’s strength, however, lies in its adaptive capacity.  The organisation is 
relatively flexible, has the capacity for creative decision making, the support of a large 
organisational network and inspirational, hands-on leadership.  This organisation also 
favoured a substantial degree of autonomy in the workplace for decision makers, but this 
resulted in senior management being unaware of some key issues because staff believed 
they had responsibility for decision making.   
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CS9 – Private Primary Producer 
CS9 is the New Zealand operation of a large primary producer with international markets and 
a strong relationship with its multi-national parent company.  This organisation is widely 
distributed in New Zealand with approximately 35 centres around the country.  CS9 is ranked 
very high in all three categories of resilience; situation awareness, management of keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity, resulting in an overall resilience ranking of very high 
(Table 8). 
Typically the organisation has a good awareness of its operating environment, its reputation 
in that environment, its key stakeholders and its risk profile.  However, where the 
organisation does lack awareness is in its knowledge of the impacts of large scale events 
that impact the regional networks CS9 relies upon such as electricity and 
telecommunications.  Further, the organisation has a limited awareness of the potential 
expectations other organisations may have of it in some types of crises, as a primary 
producer.  There are some significant keystone vulnerabilities identified for CS9 in this study.  
Most of these are already identified by CS9, and many are being actively managed at the 
present time.  Significant vulnerabilities identified for CS9 include the fragility of the 
telecommunications network and changes to the legislative environment in New Zealand.  
This organisation conducts extensive risk management programs on a regular basis and also 
engages regularly in emergency scenario exercises, based predominantly on emergency 
communications.  From an adaptive capacity perspective, CS9 has significant flexibility in 
decision making due to the financial, logistical and technical support of the parent 
organisation.  The other side of this coin however, is that for very large events, the distal 
nature of the parent organisation may impact on effective and timely communications and 
consequently on the resilience of CS9.  Silo mentality is also an issue, but improving 
communications and awareness of this issue limit the impact on resilience.  CS9 has 
indicated that in some areas it is difficult to recruit employees, and also the organisation has 
an ageing workforce; the handover of responsibility being something that CS9 has yet to 
manage adequately. 
 
CS10 – Private Technology Provider 
CS10 is the smallest organisation involved in this study with just eight full time employees.  
The organisation is a private business that operates in the supply of technological services to 
clients.   The organisation has a high overall resilience ranking (Table 8) based on a high 
situation awareness, moderate ranking for keystone vulnerabilities and a very high adaptive 
capacity. 
CS10 has a good awareness of its operating environment and how its place in that 
environment may change quickly.  The organisation is limited in its ability to prioritise 
customers in terms of recovery because it doesn’t adequately understand the requirements 
and dependencies of its customer base.  Additionally, the organisation is only just beginning 
to appreciate the range of hazards that it may face and their potential ongoing consequences 
for the business.  Situation awareness is considered to be high at CS10.  Despite some 
significant keystone vulnerabilities, most notably the telecommunications and electricity 
services, CS10 generally identifies and manages its keystone vulnerabilities well.  This is due 
in large part to the organisation’s understanding of its operating environment.  The 
organisation’s principal keystone vulnerabilities include the availability of fuel and 
maintenance for its generator as well as the limited communication of strategic direction 
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throughout the company.  The organisation has not yet engaged in planning exercises, but it 
has performed some planning, and this is an ongoing priority for CS10.  The organisation’s 
high adaptive capacity is based around the culture of the organisation, a strong balance 
sheet, financial stability, as well as excellent communications internally and good 
communications externally.  CS10 does identify a lack of a strategic direction being clearly 
articulated in the organisation, leading to a ‘fighting fires’ mentality when dealing with crises.  
Typically CS10 has very high levels of adaptive capacity. 
 
Comparison Across Case-study Organisations 
Table 8 presents the relative rankings for each resilience indicator for each of the case-study 
organisations and the composite rankings of situation awareness, management of keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity for each organisation. 
The degree of situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities or adaptive 
capacity is assessed on a qualitative basis by assessing the performance of an organisation 
relative to the resilience indicators.  Each organisation was scaled according to their 
performance in each indicator in relation to the other organisations in the study.  Therefore, 
there is at least one organisation with a very high ranking and one with a very low ranking for 
each resilience indicator.  All other organisations are compared to these two end points and 
given a relative ranking.   
The resilience profiles show the relative rankings for each attribute of resilience, and the 
envelope of resilience represents the relative overall resilience of each organisation 
comparative to the others in the study. 
 
  
   
  CASE-STUDY ORGANISATIONS 
  Indicator CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
SA1 Mod Low Mod Mod Very low Mod Very low Low Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Understanding of 
Hazards and 
Consequences  
SA2 Very low Low V.High High Mod Mod Low Low V.High Mod 
Connectivity Awareness SA3 High Low High Mod V.Low Low Low V.High High V.High 
Insurance SA4 Low Mod Low V.High Mod Mod Low V.Low High Mod 
Recovery Priorities SA5 Mod V.Low V.High High V.Low Mod Mod High V.High Low 
S
i
t
u
a
t
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n
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w
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r
e
n
e
s
s
 
SUMMARY SACOMP Mod Low High High Low Mod Low Mod V.High High 
Risk mgmt and Planning KV1 High Mod High V.High Mod High V.Low V.Low V.High Low 
Exercises KV2 V.Low High V.High V.High V.Low Mod V.Low Low V.High Low 
Internal Resources KV3 Mod V.High High High Low High Mod Low V.High Mod 
External Resources KV4 Mod High High Mod Low High Low Mod High High 
Connectivity KV5 V.Low High V.High V.High V.Low V.High Mod High High Mod 
M
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n
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f
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e
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s
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s
 
SUMMARY KVCOMP Mod High V.High V.High Mod High Low Mod V.High Mod 
Silo Mentality 
Management 
AC1 Low V.Low Mod Mod V.Low V.High Mod Mod Mod V.High 
Communications/ 
relationships 
AC2 V.Low Mod High Low Low V.High Low V.High V.High V.High 
Strategic Vision AC3 V.High Low Mod Mod V.Low V.High Mod High High Mod 
Information and 
knowledge 
AC4 Mod Mod High Mod V.Low V.High Low Mod V.High V.High 
Leadership and 
management 
AC5 High Mod High Mod V.Low V.High Mod High V.High V.High 
A
d
a
p
t
i
v
e
 
C
a
p
a
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i
t
y
 
SUMMARY ACCOMP Mod Low High Mod Low V.High Mod High V.High V.High 
OVERALL RESILIENCE Mod Mod V.High High Low High Mod High V.High High 
Table 8.  A summary of the relative resilience indicator results for each of the case-study organisations with composite results for situation awareness, 
management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity for each. 
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Appendix B. Literature Review  
B.1  Resilience: The Historical Context 
Traditionally, resilience is viewed as the qualities that enable the individual, community or 
organisation to cope with, adapt to and recover from a disaster event (Buckle et al, 2000; 
Horne, 1997; Mallak, 1998; Pelling and Uitto, 2001; Riolli and Savicki, 2003).  Although the 
term resilience has its roots in science as the ability of materials to return to their original 
form following deformation (Sheffi, 2006a) it is also used to describe the capacity of a system 
to absorb change (generally conceptualised in the form of sudden shocks) and still retain its 
essential functionality (Walker et al, 2006).  One of the most influential contributions to 
defining the term resilience is attributed to Holling in 1973 and is associated with the stability 
of ecological systems.  In the ecological literature there is a distinction between engineering 
resilience and ecological resilience, each representing different attributes of a system’s 
stability (Gunderson et al, 2002).  Engineering resilience refers to systems that exist close to 
a single state of equilibrium (Holling, 1996) and is defined by both the distance the system 
moves from this steady state and the time taken for the system to return to its original steady 
state following a disturbance (Gunderson et al 2002).  Ecological resilience describes the 
system that has no single stable state but instead may have a number of possible domains 
or behaviours (Walker et al, 1981; Gunderson et al, 2002).  Resilience in these types of 
systems is a measure of the size or magnitude of disturbance that the system can absorb 
before it restructures itself and moves into another state of behaviour (Gunderson et al, 
2002).  A third concept to appear in the literature regarding the resilience of systems is that 
of adaptive capacity; the ability of a system to change the variables that define the states of 
equilibrium (Gunderson, 2002; Luers and Lobel, 2003; Gunderson et al, 1996; Mallak, 1998). 
Evolution of the original concept of resilience has occurred through its application in 
numerous scientific disciplines.  Resilience has been discussed in relation to; climate change 
and linked to vulnerability (Timmerman, 1981); in terms of proactive and reactive resilience of 
society as a whole (Dovers and Handmer, 1992); as it relates to both ecological and social 
systems (Adger, 2000); and natural hazards (Blaikie et al, 1994) to name but a few.  Several 
excellent reviews of the literature are available by Klein et al (2003), Folke, (2006) and 
Hollnagel et al (2006) and the reader is directed towards these for a detailed discussion.  
However, as pointed out by Klein et al (2003), resilience remains a theoretical concept and 
methods for achieving improved resilience at an operational level still challenge both the 
academic and the practitioner.  Resilience applies not only to a systems ability to change or 
remain stable within a given context.  Resilience, critically, also relates to the 
appropriateness of that change or stability for the given situation and potential future contexts 
(McDonald, 2006). 
 
B.2  Organisations as Complex Adaptive Systems 
One way forward is to consider resilience in the context of a systems approach; more 
specifically in relation to complex adaptive systems.  A general systems analysis approach 
has been suggested by a number of authors as a way to assess and measure resilience at 
an organisational scale (Horne, 1997; Riolli and Saviki, 2003, Dalziell and McManus, 2004, 
Starr et al, 2004). 
Recent work into the interconnectedness of organisations has allowed researchers to identify 
the critical links and hubs of their relationships with other organisations and their participating 
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communities.  This recognition has lead to a greatly increased understanding and 
appreciation of their vulnerabilities; economically, politically, socially and environmentally.  
The advent of the information age, and the increasing reliance on computerised networks 
and communications has reduced the size of the world for organisations while at the same 
time dramatically increasing the potential for abuse of the systems. Much of the risk that 
organisations face is tied up in their intrinsic interconnectedness; the organisational network.  
The key to successful adaptation in this new, changing environment, according to Barabasi 
(2003) is to move from a tree-based organisational structure, to a web or network 
organisation that effectively utilises many inter- and intra-organisational links.  It is the 
realisation that no organisation can or does work alone that is crucial to the successful 
navigation of a crisis event. 
One of the most important outcomes of this networked economy is the potential for small 
changes at one scale to become significant, even devastating, at another.  While broken 
links generally affect only the immediate organisations involved, the failure of some links will 
lead to a ripple effect throughout the entire system (Comfort, 1999; Barabasi, 2003; WBCSD, 
2004).  Examples are numerous and include, among others, the 1997 East Asia economic 
crisis and the 1996 Power blackout in the USA and Canada.  Perrow (1984) discusses 
systemic failures or ‘accidents’; the result of standard or regular errors that compound in 
unanticipated ways and result in consequences that are unexpected.   
One of the challenges for organisations is not to over prioritise those events they can foresee 
at the expense of building the capacity to cope with those they cannot. In many instances, 
the issue of ‘risk transference’ significantly alters the perception of risk away from the high 
consequence, low probability events (Figure 3), (Etkin, 1999; Mileti, 1999; Tobin and Montz, 
1997).  Similarly, those events that have not been experienced in living memory, or even 
historically, are much less likely to be considered as worthwhile for realistic risk assessments 
(Etkin, 1999; Slovic, 1986).   
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Figure 3.  Risk Transference (after Etkin, 1999). 
However, when development or mitigation strategies fail to correctly access the risk of rare 
high-consequence events, risk is transferred from the more common hazards to extreme 
events that exceed design criteria.  Long-term vulnerability can thereby be increased.  Risk 
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transference, therefore, may be a significant obstacle to successful management of extreme 
events for organisations.  The consequences of smaller scale events are reduced to such a 
successful degree that organisations can no longer cope with the larger scale events that 
come along.  Potentially this could lead to large scale catastrophe (Holling et al, 1998). 
    
B.3  The New Zealand Context 
In New Zealand there is an increasing emphasis on creating more resilient communities.  
The changed focus from post-crisis response to pre-crisis planning originated in the early-
mid 1990’s in New Zealand and reflects a global trend (Britton and Clark, 2000; Buckle et al, 
2000; Keanini, 2003; Luers et al, 2003; McEntire, 2001; Pelling and Uitto, 2001; 
Weichselgartner, 2001).  Significant and widespread economic restructuring in the 1980’s in 
New Zealand highlighted the need to alter the way emergency management was addressed.  
This resulted in legislative changes and the establishment of the Ministry of Emergency 
Management in 1999 (subsequently renamed Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management).  The purpose of these changes was to ensure that broad risk management 
techniques become embedded in government, business and the community, thereby 
increasing overall resilience and continuity (Britton and Clark, 2000).  The current legislation 
in New Zealand for Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM Act, 2002) reflects a 
need for greater levels of responsibility from organisations with a front-line response during 
and following a crisis (for example lifeline utility providers, emergency services such as 
police, fire and health organisations, and emergency co-ordination agencies).  However, it is 
becoming more apparent that a wide range of organisations also need to increase their 
resilience because of the vital role that they play in community resilience and recovery 
(Dalziell, 2005).  In addition, the move to more comprehensive emergency management in 
New Zealand has resulted in an ‘all-hazards’ approach.  While the traditional focus of 
emergency management has been on natural hazards, the current legislation requires the 
adoption of a risk management approach which addresses all hazards including emerging 
hazards such as pandemic and terrorism.  A new National Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Plan and Guide were released in July 2006 (MCDEM, 2006).   
As New Zealand entered the 1980’s, economically it was facing huge national debt and a 
change of government in 1984 saw the introduction of an extensive program of restructuring 
the economy.  This restructuring, operating over two decades, lead to the corporatisation of 
organisations in New Zealand and has had both positive and negative impacts.  As 
highlighted by Brunsdon and Dalziell (2005) the restructuring focused on both private and 
public sectors, demanding ‘economic accountability and independence’.  This has produced 
smaller and more independent enterprises and business units resulting in greater economic 
efficiency in the short term.  However, this has reduced the capacity of organisations to 
engage in longer term management strategies that improve resilience (Brunsdon and 
Dalziell, 2005).  
Resilience may also be linked to an organisation’s key performance indicators (KPI’s).  The 
progress of organisational KPI’s can be mapped over time following a disturbance to 
determine the system’s vulnerability (Section B.5 and adaptive capacity (Section B.6), and 
ultimately its resilience.  Additionally, situation awareness (Section B.4) may be viewed as an 
overarching attribute of resilience that applies to both the pre-crisis and the post-crisis 
phases (Figure 1, after Dalziell and McManus, 2004).  The ability of an organisation to 
engage in pre-crisis planning will have a marked impact on the degree of change in KPIs.  An 
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organisation, therefore, needs to consider its planning strategies across the 4R’s.  The 4R’s, 
Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery, represent time-based clusters for 
emergency management activities and are co-ordinated into a pattern of pre- and post-crisis 
action.  Emergency management in New Zealand uses the 4R’s to emphasize the need to 
plan in the pre-crisis phase to reduce the impact of an event as well as in the traditional post-
crisis response and recovery phases (Britton, 1998).  Furthermore, planning across the 4R’s 
emphasises the importance of linking resilience strategies for crisis situations to day-to-day 
pre-event operations.   
f (Adaptive Capacity) 
Improve Situation Awareness 
Reduction Readiness Response Recovery 
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Time
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Figure 4.  Diagram showing the use of key performance indicators (KPIs) as a measure of 
system resilience, where resilience is a function of the area under the curve defined by 
system vulnerability and system adaptive capacity. 
 
B.4  Situation Awareness 
It is critical that organisations understand that they do not work alone if they are to 
successfully navigate a crisis.  They must recognise themselves as parts of a wider network, 
and indeed as networks themselves.  As a result there is an increasing need for decision 
makers, and organisations generally, to have common and shared situation awareness.  
Originally coined in relation to military pilots the modern concept of situation awareness is 
traditionally attributed to Endsley (1995) and originally described the situation awareness of 
an individual or agent within a system; situation awareness is: 
‘the perception of the elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of 
their meaning, and the projection of their status into the near future’. 
However, as recognition of teamwork increased, so did the necessity to look at situation 
awareness from a different, more complex perspective.  Even those decisions ultimately 
made by one individual are often based on information from a much wider team.  
Furthermore, the sum of the individual knowledge or awareness does not represent the 
overall situation awareness of the system (Salas et al, 1995).  While team or shared situation 
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awareness is rapidly becoming a significant field of research there is no agreed upon 
definition (Salmon et al, 2006).  The terminology is diverse.  
Events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 
A fundamental approach to increasing an organisation’s situation awareness is by 
• increased awareness of value systems and the development of shared mental 
• appreciation of a team environment and integration of diverse information (Coutu, 
• the identification of solutions that may not have been overtly apparent (Starr et al, 
• the opportunity to learn from emergency experiences and apply that knowledge in 
• the fostering and encouragement of self efficacy (Jex and Bliese, 1999), and;  
• improving the persistence of individuals and groups to achieve predefined goals in an 
Improving situation awareness about crises also involves learning about the types of 
Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004 have highlighted how limited situation awareness has 
contributed to major deficiencies in the emergency response (Bahora et al, 2003, Titan 
Systems Corporation, 2002; Ntuen, 2006; Runyan, 2006).  Researchers and practitioners are 
therefore becoming increasingly concerned with developing improved situation awareness 
among teams.  Specifically this is in relation to the response and recovery for individual 
organisations as well as from a multi-organisational approach, particularly in inherently 
dynamic and complex situations.  
encouraging some experience of pseudo-crisis situations through the use of scenario 
exercises.  Coates (2006) suggests that organisations have a ‘severely limited psychological 
capacity’ to look at incidents in other corporations and apply the lessons learned to 
themselves.  Therefore, scenario exercises offer significant value for the networked 
organisation, specifically if they involve participants from across a number of internal 
divisions and/or external interconnected organisations.  The benefits include:  
models (Starr et al, 2004);  
2002; Flin, 1996; Paton, 1996; Paton and Jackson, 2002; Quanjel et al, 1998, Salas 
et al 1999);   
2004);  
novel situations (Paton and Jackson, 2002);  
emergency situation (Klimoski and Brickner, 1987; Paton and Jackson, 2002). 
emergency situations that may occur.  Many organisations have engaged in some sort of risk 
identification process but few take this process one step further and combine risks of similar 
nature or expected response.  In an emergency often the same types of issues will be faced 
and actions will be common across crisis types (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993).  Furthermore, 
while there is debate on the validity and usefulness of emergency plans (Seaman and 
Williams, 2005), for those organisations that do create emergency plans, these must be 
tested, practiced and exercised to be useful in a real emergency (Coates, 2006; Coutu, 
2002).  It is also vital that organisations do not just focus on those events that they can 
foresee or those that they have already experienced.  Sheffi (2006a) suggests that 
organisations prepare for the unknown by increasing resilience; not only by creating 
redundancy but also through overall flexibility and agility. 
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B.5  Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
rent definitions and applications depending 
on the objectives of the researchers/practitioners and the situation within which it is applied.  
f the strongest 
influences on post crisis survival, particularly for small businesses.  The degree of structural 
s prior to an event;  
cies, and  
Add in an organisational context, the vulnerability of key 
groups that contribute to an organisation must also be considered from a business continuity 
s critical and the global and interconnected 
nature of organisations  is important to consider.   Wisner (2005) observes that vulnerability 
ighlighted by a landmark 
study in 1991 looking at the performance of lifeline utility organisations in a large scale 
The term vulnerability is one which has many diffe
As such there is considerable confusion over the use of the term vulnerability and assessing 
and modelling vulnerability in the real world.  Good summaries are given by Klein et al 
(2003), Villagrán De León (2006) and Füssel (2005) and highlight some of the difficulties 
associated with determining what vulnerability is as well as how to measure and assess 
vulnerability to provide meaningful results.  The reader is directed to these summaries for a 
detailed account of how vulnerability has evolved as a term since the 1970’s. 
A number of studies of organisational vulnerability have highlighted some o
damage to the physical location of an organisation and its degree of disaster preparedness 
has been shown to have some influence on business survival rates (Alesch and Holly, 1998; 
Alesch et al, 2001; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Tierney, 1997; Webb et al, 2000).  
However, much stronger indicators of organisational failure following a crisis (see (Durkin, 
1984; Tierney, 1997; Alesch and Holly, 1998; Alesch et al, 2001; Tierney, 1997; Webb et al, 
2000; Chang, 2001a; Chang, 2001b; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002) include:  
• interruptions to infrastructure,  
• experiencing financial difficultie
• operational difficulties, problems with interdependen
• problems with the supply chain.   
itionally, Paton (1999) identified that, 
perspective. 
The scale at which vulnerability is assessed i
manifests itself very differently at a household level compared to a national level even for the 
same event.  This is also true of organisations where what is highly vulnerable to a small firm 
of 1-2 employees may be vastly different to what is vulnerable to a multi-national 
organisation.  Hence, the assessment of vulnerability should be conducted separately at 
different scales (Villagrán De León, 2006).  Watts and Bolhe (1993) suggest that vulnerability 
is not a static entity, but rather it is a dynamic and complex condition that cannot and should 
not be reduced to simplistic terms.  From this perspective a more holistic and systemic 
approach to vulnerability may be more suitable for organisations.   
Interdependence between organisations in New Zealand was h
hypothetical earthquake scenario in Wellington, the nation’s capital (CAE, 1991).  The 
interface with co-ordinating organisations such as Civil Defence was illustrated in this study 
as a critical facet to the successful response and recovery of lifeline utilities and the wider 
community that they serve.  Furthermore, this study identified that individual organisations 
must create their own emergency planning strategies and be involved with the strategies of 
those on whom they will depend in a crisis.  The Wellington Lifelines study and the others in 
New Zealand that followed this model clearly showed that interdependence of utilities is 
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made more vulnerable by our increasingly sophisticated world and our reliance on advanced 
technology.  The vulnerability associated with interdependency is further enhanced by 
expectations of the general public for both private and public organisations to display more 
accountability in a crisis situation (WELG, 1994).  Therefore, the intrinsic connectivity of 
organisations, together with the interdependencies that arise as a result, have a significant 
impact on organisational vulnerability. 
Further to the concept of interdependencies in a system and the assessment of their 
vulnerabilities is the notion of keystone vulnerabilities.  The term ‘keystone’ can be used to 
.6  Adaptive Capacity 
to adaptive capacity is divided into two rather distinct categories.  
There is a huge body of research on adaptive capacity as it relates to socio-environmental 
ortant to realise that adaptive capacity is not a static feature of any system.  There 
are a number of studies (Folke et al, 2002, deVries, 1985) that look at how these 
denote the presence of integral species in an ecosystem.  Typically, a keystone species is 
one which has an influence on its environment or ecosystem that is disproportionate to its 
size or abundance (Wikipedia, 2007).  The loss of this species can cause a significant shift in 
the ecosystem; sometimes causing its eventual destruction.  Keystone can also have an 
architectural meaning and is described as either ‘the wedge-shaped piece at the highest 
point of an arch that locks the other pieces in place’ or ‘something on which associated 
things depend for support’ (The New Penguin English Dictionary, 2000).  These keystone 
vulnerabilities are components in the organisational system, which by their loss or 
impairment have the potential to cause exceptional effects throughout the system; 
associated components of the system depend on them for support.  This is most often 
observed in the supply chain of organisations.  Numerous examples exist of cascade type 
failures resulting from the loss of one supplier whose criticality to the entire system was not 
recognized until it was lost.  For example, the Toyota-Aisin crisis (Watts, 2003) that involved 
the loss of a single factory in Japan that was solely responsible for the production of a critical 
valve needed for all Toyota vehicles.  There are two aspects to identifying keystone 
vulnerabilities.  Firstly is the speed at which a component failure has a negative impact (rapid 
or insidious) and secondly is the number of component failures required to have a significant 
negative impact on an organization (discrete or cascading).   
 
B
The literature in relation 
systems, particularly in relation to climate change research.  This work is matched by the 
volumes of research into organisational adaptive capacity.  This discussion focuses on the 
organisational research domain, but a short introduction on the socio-environmental system 
approach is warranted.  However, this discussion doesn’t aim to provide the reader with any 
great depth in this regard; rather the reader is referred to some of the excellent summaries of 
this work for more detail (Klein et al, 2003, Brooks, 2003, Gallopin, 2006, Smit and Wandel, 
2006). 
It is imp
components change over time and in response to environmental changes (economic, social, 
political and institutional) (Smit and Wandel, 2006).  Furthermore, researchers have 
considered the inter-relationships between determinants of adaptive capacity, recognising 
that strengths or weaknesses in one aspect, for example managerial ability, may influence 
other determinants such as the reduction of psychological stress among workers (Smit and 
Wandel, 2006). 
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The concept of adaptive capacity is at the core of current organisational resilience 
methodology.  Adaptive capacity is defined as the ability of an enterprise to alter its ‘strategy, 
operations, management systems, governance structure and decision-support capabilities’ to 
withstand perturbations and disruptions (Starr et al, 2004).  Organisations that focus on their 
resilience in the face of disruption generally adopt adaptive qualities and proactive 
responses.  Furthermore, they emphasise positive behaviour within the enterprise and within 
employees and look at disruptions as being opportunities for advancement (Mallak, 1998; 
Folke et al, 2002). 
The study of adaptive capacity in relation to organisational systems has resulted in 
considerable advances in recent years particularly regarding the cultural capital of an 
organisation and the effects this may have on its ability to withstand crises.  Many 
organisations have been shown to exhibit favourable workplace cultures that help them to 
adapt to changes in their operating environment, even when these changes are unforeseen 
and unexpected.  Examples include Nokia, Toyota (Sheffi, 2006a), Dell (Sheffi, 2005), UPS 
(Coutu, 2002) and Coca-Cola (Seaman and Williams, 2005).  While terminology differs 
regarding what attributes actually make up such effective organisational cultures, there are 
some widely accepted qualities that organisations can encourage: 
• The ability of both leaders and general staff to view crises from a positive and 
opportunistic perspective is important in the adaptive organisation (for example 
Borneman, 2005; Hagevik, 1998; Norman et al., 2005; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; 
Penrose, 2000; Sheffi, 2005; Starr et al., 2004).   
• The quality of leadership and the degree of empowerment through to lower levels in an 
organisation is increasingly seen as a critical facet of an adaptive organisation’s culture 
(for example Sheffi, 2006a; 2006b; 2005; Kerfoot, 2005; Hagevik, 1998; Norman et al, 
2005; Coutu, 2002).   
o Empowerment, for instance, has been identified as a key part of the successful 
response by the US Coast Guard during Hurricane Katrina and the saving of over 
24,000 lives (Sheffi, 2006b).   
• Leadership during times of crisis and non-crisis is vital to developing an enhanced 
adaptive capacity in an organisation.   
o This may be achieved by the development and communication of mutual value 
systems between the leadership and workforce in an organisation.   
o As identified by Sheffi (2005) ‘flexible and fast-responding companies align the 
employees’ interests with the organisations at a fundamental level.  Their 
employees identify deeply with their company and fulfil their personal needs when 
the company succeeds’. 
• Additionally, employees that are conditioned to expect the unexpected contribute 
significantly to an organisation with a high adaptive capacity.     
o The ability for an organisation to combine the development and testing of a plan 
with enhancing the capacity of its staff to cope with the unexpected is a critical 
balance.  No organisation can plan for every possible circumstance and therefore 
the organisational culture becomes vital.   
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o ‘Culture contributes to resilience by endowing employees with a set of principles 
regarding the proper response when the unexpected occurs and when the formal 
organisation’s policy does not cover the situation at hand or is too slow to react’ 
(Sheffi, 2005).      
Considerable progress has been made towards developing more resilient organisations in 
the face of disasters of all descriptions.  However, it has been the growing dependence of 
businesses and other organisations on computer systems, networks and the Internet (Riolli 
and Savicki, 2003; Horne, 1997) that is beginning to facilitate the application of resilience 
rather than recovery into the mainstream of organisational management.     
There is a fine line between organisational resilience and recovery.  An organisation may 
have a high level of resilience, and hence a lowered vulnerability, but its post-disaster 
condition may lead to a very different organisational structure than before the disaster event.  
This is synonymous with the concept of ecological resilience outlined previously and shows 
that organisations are complex self-organising systems with multiple equilibrium states.  
Many organisations that focus solely on their post disaster recovery, rather than focus on 
becoming more resilient, will often try to return to their pre-disaster condition (Tobin 1999).  
However, recovery rarely addresses the causal problems leading to the disaster situation in 
the first place, and may in-fact set up the next disaster (Tobin, 1999; Comfort et al, 1999). 
The interest in creating an increased adaptive capacity during and immediately following a 
disaster has led some researchers to propose a set of adaptive features to enhance 
organizational and societal resilience (Weick, 1993; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003; Mallak, 
1998).  This includes, for example, bricolage, which is the capacity to adapt known 
information and apply it to the current situation in a creative manner, and virtual role systems, 
the ability of sub-sets of an organization to take on the role and responsibility of absent 
members.  
Other features include wisdom or the capacity to know the limits of the information at hand, 
and the ability to seek out additional information, respectful interaction, positive adaptive 
behaviour and the development of a tolerance for uncertainty (Weick, 1993). 
Dalziell and McManus (2004) introduce the concept that systems (specifically organisational 
systems) can adapt to changes in different ways.  Firstly they may use existing responses 
and apply them to the problems at hand, which may involve up-scaling this response.  
Secondly, existing responses may be utilised in a new context for a crisis situation.  Thirdly, 
an organisation may develop novel responses and apply them to a problem.  The problems 
may be new and unforeseen or those that the organisation has been able to see coming.  
Typically organisations enlist either a command and control type structure to deal with crisis 
or a more organic and innovative approach (Dalziell and McManus, 2004).  Recent research 
is pointing to the increased ability of organisations to respond effectively using a more 
creative and flexible decision making structure.  This appears to be because automation and 
rigour (more associated with command and control decision making) may actually hinder 
adaptive capacity by reducing situation awareness (Endsley et al, 2003) and ultimately 
performance; systems must be more flexible or they risk becoming redundant (Stanton and 
Baber, 2006). 
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